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Does the existing anti-manipulation framework effectively deter
algorithmic manipulation? With the dual increase of algorithmic trading and
the occurrence of “mini-flash crashes” in the market linked to manipulation,
this question has become more pressing in recent years. In the past thirty years,
the financial markets have undergone a sea change as technological
advancements and innovations have fundamentally altered the structure and
operation of the markets. Key to this change is the introduction and dominance
of trading algorithms. Whereas initial algorithmic trading relied on preset
electronic instructions to execute trading strategies, new technology is
introducing artificially intelligent (“AI”) trading algorithms that learn
dynamically from data and respond intuitively to market changes. These
technological developments have exposed significant shortcomings in the
effectiveness of anti-manipulation laws, particularly regarding one of their
fundamental goals: deterring market manipulation.
Preventing manipulation remains a key feature of the legal regime
governing the financial markets. Rampant manipulation undermines the
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viability of the market and, in the case of algorithmic manipulation, increases
systemic risks within the market. Deterring algorithmic manipulation is thus
essential to the viability and stability of the market. But credible and effective
deterrence of wrongdoing requires certainty of punishment, which is
increasingly unattainable with respect to algorithmic manipulation under the
existing legal regime. Specifically, the law of manipulation tethers liability to
scienter, which algorithms cannot legally form. Further, deciphering the intent
of the human behind the algorithm can be a near-impossible task in all but the
most egregious cases. The scienter-focused nature of the anti-manipulation
framework therefore diminishes the disciplinary power of the law, weakening
deterrence and incentivizing algorithmic manipulation.
This Article demonstrates that the scienter-centric analysis
undergirding anti-manipulation laws creates gaps in the detection and
punishment of algorithmic manipulation that weaken the current legal regime’s
deterrent effect. The acute failure of the law to punish algorithmic manipulation
incentivizes potential wrongdoers to utilize algorithms to cloak their misdeeds,
exposing the markets to significant systemic harm. Notably, unlike other
scholars and policymakers that view transparency as the ultimate solution to
increase accountability for algorithms, this Article highlights the potential
limitations of relying primarily on transparency. Rather, the Article urges
changes to the legal framework to modernize its applicability: eschew the
scienter requirement and, instead, focus on the resulting harm of the algorithm
on the market. Together, these proposals are likely to credibly deter algorithmic
manipulation, safeguarding the viability, efficiency, and stability of
the markets.
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INTRODUCTION
To state the obvious: human traders are no longer at the
epicenter of the financial markets. Computers running algorithmic
trading programs have taken over as the primary “traders” in the
market, while humans execute merely ten percent of all trades today. 1
Algorithmic trading can be categorized broadly as either preset
algorithms or artificial intelligence (“AI”) algorithms. Preset algorithms
rely on programmed instructions to execute a specified trading strategy.
These algorithms respond to new data and change their strategies
within determined parameters, operating according to precise
1.
Evelyn Cheng, Just 10% of Trading Is Regular Stock Picking, JPMorgan Estimates,
CNBC (June 13, 2017, 4:49 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/13/death-of-the-human-investorjust-10-percent-of-trading-is-regular-stock-picking-jpmorgan-estimates.html
[https://perma.cc/
DXZ3-YAFJ].
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electronic commands. AI algorithms, on the other hand, differ
meaningfully from preset algorithms—they are tasked with
accomplishing a goal and left to figure out the best way to do it. AI
algorithms learn from prior decisions, dynamically assess new
information, and optimize their solutions to reflect new data. 2 Both
forms of algorithmic trading programs are well suited for the financial
markets because of their capacity to analyze large swaths of data and
to execute complex trading strategies, responding almost
instantaneously to new information and changed market conditions.3
In the past thirty years, algorithmic trading has come to
dominate the financial markets, and algorithms are involved in almost
every aspect of trading today. The dominance of algorithmic trading has
resulted in significant benefits, including lowered trading costs, greater
market accessibility, faster trade execution, and greater market
efficiency and liquidity.4 Notwithstanding these benefits, algorithms
also make it easier for would-be manipulators to distort the markets,
with potentially disastrous consequences, and cloak their misdeeds to
avoid detection and punishment. For example, in 2010, the Dow Jones
Index experienced one of the largest single-day drops in history because
of the efforts of a trader to create fake buy-sell orders using an
algorithmic trading program that went haywire.5 The “2010 Flash
Crash” roiled the markets for less than a half hour and yet resulted in
billions of dollars of losses in market capitalization for companies and
in investor funds.6 Since then, mini-flash crashes have become more
commonplace, spurred to a large extent by the prevalence of algorithmic
trading and exacerbated by the use of algorithms to distort and deceive

2.
See, e.g., Michael J. McGowan, iBrief, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading:
Use and Controversy, 9 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 2010, ¶ 2 (discussing how high frequency (“HF”)
trading firms use algorithms to make assumptions about the market and trade stocks
in milliseconds).
3.
See id. ¶¶ 15–18.
4.
See Rajan Lakshmi A. & Vedala Naga Sailaja, Survey of Algorithmic Trading Strategies
in Equities and Derivatives, 8 INT’L J. MECH. ENG’G & TECH. 817, 821 (2017) (describing the
positive market impacts of algorithmic and high-frequency trading).
5.
Jill Treanor, The 2010 ‘Flash Crash’: How It Unfolded, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2015,
1:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/22/2010-flash-crash-new-york-stockexchange-unfolded [https://perma.cc/542L-JMHV]:
In a matter of minutes the Dow Jones index lost almost 9% of its value – in a sequence[ ]
of events that quickly became known as “flash crash” . . . . [O]fficials in the US [blamed
the crash on] big bets by a trader on Chicago’s derivatives exchange. . . . [A] mutual
fund had used an automated algorithm trading strategy to sell contracts known as eminis. It was the largest change in the daily position of any investor so far that year
and sparked selling by other traders, including high frequency traders.
6.
Id.
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the markets.7 In the past five years, both the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”) (collectively, the “Commissions”) have increased their
enforcement actions for market manipulation, many involving
algorithmic trading, but with mixed results.8
The prevention of market manipulation was, and remains, a key
feature of the laws governing the securities and commodities markets.9
Rampant and unfettered market manipulation threatens the viability
of the financial markets, thereby making the deterrence of market
manipulation foundational to the markets’ survival.10 The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and the Commodity Exchange
Act of 1936 (“CEA”) (collectively, the “Acts”), which govern the
securities and commodities markets respectively, provide the legal antimanipulation framework applicable to the financial markets.11
Importantly, under both Acts, liability for market manipulation hinges
on proving that the accused acted with scienter—that is, intentionally
or recklessly—in distorting the market. Historically, the emphasis on
scienter has proven to be a difficult hurdle for regulators to overcome in
enforcing anti-manipulation laws against human traders.12 These
challenges are only further exacerbated in algorithm-dominated
markets, as scienter becomes more difficult to identify, decreasing the
likelihood that the existing legal framework can detect and punish
market manipulation.13
The recurrence of algorithm-related market distortion coupled
with inconsistent regulatory enforcements against such misconduct
raise questions about the capacity of the anti-manipulation legal
framework to achieve one of its most fundamental tasks: deterring
market manipulation. In today’s markets, credibly deterring market
7.
Alexander Munk & Erhan Bayraktar, Opinion: The Stock Market Has About 12
Mini Flash Crashes a Day — and We Can’t Prevent Them, MARKETWATCH (July 31, 2017, 12:47
PM ET), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-stock-market-has-about-12-mini-flash-crashesa-day-and-we-cant-prevent-them-2017-07-31 [https://perma.cc/85Y3-936H].
8.
See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Legitimate Yet Manipulative: The Conundrum of Open-Market
Manipulation, 68 DUKE L.J. 479, 484 (2018).
9.
Id. at 488 (“Preventing market manipulation was one of the initial motivators behind the
adoption of the securities and commodities laws.”).
10. See id. at 488–90 (explaining the far-reaching consequences of market manipulation).
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq; Commodity Exchange Act of
1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27f.
12. E.g., DiPlacido v. CFTC, 364 F. App’x 657 (2d Cir. 2009). DiPlacido was the CFTC’s first
court win against price manipulation. See id.; see also Fletcher, supra note 8, at 501 (discussing
the difficulty the SEC and the CFTC have historically had in successfully bringing price
manipulation claims).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 659 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (discussing the
challenge of proving intent in a spoofing case, as legitimate trading and spoofing are both
intentional acts).
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manipulation is both a practical and philosophical issue that strains—
and will continue to strain—the boundaries of how the legal framework
defines and conceptualizes punishable misconduct in an increasingly
algorithm-dominated market. The inability of the legal regime to
credibly deter algorithm-related manipulation poses significant
challenges for the efficacy of the legal framework, the reputation of the
regulators, and the viability of the market. This Article grapples with
the questions that arise when laws intended for humans are applied to
algorithms and the consequences of the resulting mismatch.
This Article demonstrates that the application of existing antimanipulation laws and regulations to algorithmic trading is ineffectual
in holding anyone accountable for an algorithm’s manipulative
behavior. The law’s emphasis on scienter to assign liability weakens the
disciplinary power of the legal framework, which is only worsened with
algorithms because scienter is easily obscured. With preset algorithms
and in “easy cases,” the intent of the programmer can be evident from
the code and the paper trail left behind by the algorithm. In such cases,
regulators can identify the programmer’s manipulative intent and hold
her liable for the algorithm’s misconduct.14
In more complex cases, however, as when the algorithm distorts
the market using facially legitimate transactions, determining the
necessary scienter to hold the human behind the algorithm liable for
manipulation becomes a difficult and near-impossible undertaking. The
exercise becomes all the more challenging when AI algorithms
employing machine learning are considered. In learning and problemsolving, there is no human involvement in the algorithm’s
decisionmaking, and, as such, any decision made is attributable to the
algorithm exclusively.15
Legally, algorithms cannot have intent, which then raises the
question: How does the law address manipulative behavior of an
algorithm, both preset and AI-based? The traditional limitations of
anti-manipulation laws, which place a heavy evidentiary burden on
proving a trader’s manipulative intent, are brought into sharp relief in
algorithmic markets. Even in the absence of algorithms, proving a
trader’s mental state has always been difficult;16 with the involvement
14. See, e.g., Amanat v. SEC, 269 F. App’x 217 (3d Cir. 2008).
15. For an example of the analytical and strategic capabilities of AI, especially AI’s potential
to outperform human competitors in an environment that requires quick, complex analysis, see
Kelsey Piper, Starcraft Is a Deep, Complicated War Strategy Game. Google’s Alphastar AI Crushed
It., VOX, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/1/24/18196177/ai-artificial-intelligence-googledeepmind-starcraft-game (last updated Jan. 24, 2019, 7:04 PM EST) [https://perma.cc/385AYGR3].
16. See Fletcher, supra note 8, at 515 (noting the “inherent difficulty” of proving intent,
particularly because “direct evidence of a defendant’s manipulative intent [is rarely] available”).
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of algorithms, it may be almost impossible in the absence of a
metaphorical “smoking gun.” Rather than credibly identifying and
punishing algorithm-related manipulation, the scienter requirement
reduces the disciplinary power of the anti-manipulation laws,
concomitantly weakening the regime’s deterrent effect. Fundamentally,
there is a mismatch between the legal requirements to punish
manipulation that require proving scienter and the realities of
algorithmic design in which the intent of the programmer can be
obscure or undecipherable. This incongruence undermines the capacity
of the law to identify, detect, and effectively punish algorithm-related
manipulation—all important factors in credible deterrence.
Under the theory of deterrence, credible and effective deterrence
depends on certainty and severity of punishment for wrongdoing—the
higher the likelihood of punishment and the greater the severity of
punishment for misconduct, the more effective the liability framework
in achieving deterrence. To date, regulators have focused primarily on
increasing the severity of punishment to achieve deterrence. Fines and
penalties
for
manipulation,
particularly
algorithm-related
manipulation, have increased significantly over the past decade.17
Similarly, there has been a notable expansion in criminal prosecutions
for manipulation.18 But, as research has shown, increasing the severity
of sanctions is an unproductive approach to deterring misconduct if
punishment is uncertain.19 This Article demonstrates that, in all but
the most egregious cases, the existing anti-manipulation framework’s
scienter requirement increases the difficulty of proving manipulation,
makes enforcement uncertain and unequal across markets, and results
in dissimilar liability for similar harm.20
To respond to the lack of accountability of algorithms, scholars
and policymakers have often proposed improving the transparency
and explainability of algorithms.21 More transparent, explainable
algorithms are less likely to be misused and, to the extent they are, it
17. See DIV. OF ENF’T, SEC, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/
enforcement-annual-report-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY6Z-T2BN] (noting increases in the
number of actions filed by the SEC and monetary relief awarded in enforcement actions); Press
Release, CFTC, CFTC Division of Enforcement Issues Annual Report for FY 2019 (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8085-19 [https://perma.cc/KG7H-TUWR] (same,
for the CFTC).
18. See infra Section II.C.1; see also sources cited supra note 17 (noting increased cooperation
between financial regulators and criminal authorities).
19. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate
Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507, 518–27 (2018) (discussing the insufficiencies of deterrencebased punishments in a corporate context).
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Section IV.A. Please note, the terms transparent and explainable are synonyms
in this context.
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is easier for regulators to hold the human behind the algorithm liable
for the effects of the algorithm’s conduct and decisionmaking.22
Regulators and academics, therefore, believe that being able to “see
into” the algorithm is the best response to minimizing the potential for
misconduct and, ultimately, deterring manipulative activity. While this
Article recognizes the promise and potential of enhanced transparency,
it highlights the inadequacy of relying exclusively on explainability as
a panacea for the shortcomings of the legal framework in deterring
algorithm-related manipulation.
This Article, therefore, proposes eliminating scienter from the
anti-manipulation framework’s requirements and, instead, advocates
focusing on how the transaction harms the market in determining
liability for algorithm-related manipulation. A harm-focused
framework would eliminate the uncertainty that accompanies proving
scienter, enabling regulators to more effectively punish manipulators.
By increasing the efficacy of the legal regime in holding manipulators
accountable for the misconduct of their algorithms, a harm-based
liability regime would emphasize certainty of punishment, enhancing
its potential deterrent effect. Additionally, this Article proposes
harmonized regulatory oversight of algorithmic trading to minimize the
gaps between the SEC’s and the CFTC’s approach to algorithms. The
disjointed and inconsistent approach of the regulators results in
dissimilar liability for similar conduct in related markets, diminishing
the deterrent effect of the legal framework. Meaningful, consistent
regulations applicable to algorithms are, therefore, key to credibly
deterring algorithm-related market manipulation.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the theory of
deterrence, emphasizing the limitations of severity in achieving
deterrence and how uncertainty undermines deterrence. This Part also
examines the importance of deterrence to regulating the financial
markets. Part II turns its attention to the anti-manipulation framework
and how algorithms are used in the modern marketplace. Specifically,
this Part provides a primer on relevant anti-manipulation provisions
that are most applicable to algorithm-related manipulation. Part II also
describes algorithmic trading and AI machine-learning trading
programs and analyzes the possible ways in which algorithm-related
manipulation could manifest in the financial markets. Part III analyzes
the mismatch between algorithmic trading and the scienter-focused
anti-manipulation framework, demonstrating the various ways and
extent to which the law engenders uncertainty and reduces deterrence.
Part IV addresses the market implications of the legal regime’s
22. See infra Section IV.A.
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failure to deter manipulation and explores potential pathways
to minimize the uncertainty the law generates in punishing
algorithm-related manipulation.
I. THE THEORY OF DETERRENCE
In the 1930s, the prevalence of manipulation and evidence of its
rampant effects on the markets and investors propelled congressional
action to regulate the financial markets and outlaw manipulation.23
Today, despite the dramatic changes to the structure and operation of
the financial markets, manipulation remains a common form of market
misconduct and, indeed, the forms of manipulation have evolved
alongside the markets.24 Consequently, deterring market manipulation
continues to be a central focus for both the CFTC and the SEC, the
primary financial market regulators.25
This Part ties together the theory and reality of deterrence and
provides foundational explanation and support for the importance of
deterrence to the functioning of the financial markets. It begins with a
discussion of deterrence theory, highlighting the importance of
certainty and severity in deterring misconduct. Next, this Part
examines the market benefits that arise from an effective manipulation
deterrence regime.
A. A Primer on Deterrence Theory
Deterrence theory is a law and economics-based school of
thought that posits a person will violate the law if her expected utility
from the crime exceeds her disutility from not committing the crime.26
That is, the theory presumes that a trader will weigh the costs and
benefits of her conduct in deciding whether to engage in misconduct,
23. See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation”
in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 503 (1991) (discussing the history of
market regulations).
24. Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1287–93 (2017)
(describing the new forms of market manipulation that emerged following the flash crashes).
25. See Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis, and Deterrence,
31 ENERGY L.J. 1, 6 (2010) (“Several statutes proscribe manipulation of commodity markets. These
include the CEA, which has as its purpose the prevention and deterrence of price
manipulation . . . .”); Fletcher, supra note 8, at 488 (“Preventing market manipulation was one of
the initial motivators behind the adoption of the securities and commodities laws.”).
26. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968) (proposing an economic framework for analyzing criminal punishment); see also A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 45, 47 (2000) (stating that a criminal will “commit the act if and only if his
expected utility from doing so, taking into account his gain and the chance of his being caught and
sanctioned, exceeds his utility if he does not commit the act”).
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such as manipulation. If a scheme will result in penalties that exceed
her gains, the trader will be deterred from engaging in the scheme. By
adopting measures that increase the cost of violating the law, a
deterrence-focused legal framework decreases the likelihood that a
person will commit a crime.27 Thus, to deter market manipulation, the
legal framework must focus on increasing the potential costs of
manipulation to dissuade a would-be bad actor from engaging
in misconduct.28
Under deterrence theory, two primary factors potentially
increase the costs a criminal faces: the certainty of punishment and the
potential severity of sanctions.29 Certainty of punishment refers to the
likelihood that the would-be perpetrator will suffer consequences for
her crime.30 More than just the likelihood of getting caught, certainty
incorporates several probabilities such as the possibility of detection,
apprehension, conviction, and sanctions.31 Important to the assessment
of certainty of punishment is the scope and substance of the legal
regime. The legal framework must provide regulators with the
necessary tools, resources, and authority to meaningfully address the
misconduct.32 For example, if regulators lack the necessary resources or
expertise to identify misconduct, the law’s deterrent effect is weakened.
Likewise, if the applicable laws are narrow, only capturing the most

27. See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 783 (2010) (explaining deterrence with a utility equation).
28. See, e.g., Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be
Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 16 (2011) (“The theory of deterrence is predicated on
the idea that a sanction regime, by affecting the relative anticipated costs and benefits of a crime,
can lead at least some members of a population to choose not to commit crime.”).
29. See Paternoster, supra note 27, at 776 (discussing the two main factors that inform
deterrence theory). A third factor is usually included in the cost calculation—celerity (i.e., the
swiftness with which punishment is meted out). See Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating
Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory
and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 865 (2006). But as deterrence theory has developed, certainty
and severity have become the focus of regulators, academics, and policymakers. See, e.g., Yvonne
M. Dutton, Crime and Punishment: Assessing Deterrence Theory in the Context of Somali Pirates,
46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 607, 628 (2014) (“Scholars typically focus on two principal
considerations that inform the calculation of costs with a well-enforced criminal justice system:
the certainty of punishment and its likely severity.”).
30. Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of Globalization, 91
IOWA L. REV. 505, 519 (2006). It should be noted here that certainty does not refer to the certainty
(or uncertainty) that one’s actions constitute a crime.
31. Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295,
1306 (2008).
32. See Lin, supra note 24, at 1303 (“[U]ntil new precedents, principles, and rules are firmly
established, there will be significant enforcement challenges for regulators as they combat the new
methods of market manipulation.”).
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blatant misconduct, wrongdoers may not be deterred from breaking
the law.33
Also important to the effectiveness of deterrence is that the legal
regime must clearly identify for the public when conduct is illegal. A
legal framework that is overly broad or vague may obscure the legality
of conduct, thereby impairing the ability of market actors to reasonably
assess whether their conduct is permissible. 34 Thus, on this prong,
deterrence is effective if regulators have strong, suitable tools to enforce
the regime and market actors know whether they are violating the law.
The second consideration that increases the likelihood of
deterrence is the potential severity of the sanctions. Severity refers to
the length of sentences, the size of potential monetary fines, or the
magnitude of any other sanctions that may be levied against a person
for breaking the law.35 For example, it would be expected that a crime
that carries a jail term may deter would-be criminals more than one
that carries only a monetary fine. This highlights an important
observation with respect to severity—to be effective at deterring,
sanctions must be nuanced.36 That is, if sanctions are all equally high,
individuals have little reason to engage in lesser crimes. 37 Marginal
deterrence responds to this issue by varying punishment based on the
magnitude of the crime.38 Thus, to deter manipulation, the sanctions
must be severe enough to increase the cost calculus of the manipulative
scheme to the trader, but also graduated to reflect varying levels
of seriousness.
Early models of deterrence theory treated certainty and severity
as the sole factors in achieving deterrence.39 Neoclassical models,
33. Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical
Analysis, U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2185 (2010) (illustrating how a narrow fraud prohibition would fail
to deter subtle forms of fraud, despite lowering related “overdeterrence costs”).
34. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984) (“If the legal standard is uncertain, even actors
who behave ‘optimally’ in terms of overall social welfare will face some chance of being held liable
because of the unpredictability of the legal rule.”).
35. Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199,
203 (2013).
36. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 34, at 999–1000 (explaining that one approach to
correct the distortions caused by uncertainty is to “promulgat[e] enforcement guidelines to make
enforcement decisions more predictable”).
37. Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1245 (1985) (“[R]aising the sanction with the expected harmfulness of acts
gives parties who are not [initially] deterred incentives to do less harm.”).
38. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 26, at 63 (“Deterrence of a more harmful act because
its expected sanction exceeds that for a less harmful act is sometimes referred to as marginal
deterrence.” (emphasis omitted)).
39. See Nagin, supra note 35, at 205–06 (“[O]ne of the greatest curbs on crime is not the
[severity] of punishments, but their infallibility. . . . The certainty of punishment even if moderate
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however, have expanded the theory’s focus to account for how individual
behavior and subjective considerations may impact deterrence. First,
deterrence depends on a would-be criminal’s subjective evaluation of
risk.40 To the extent a criminal ignores or minimizes the risk of being
caught, deterrence may be limited.41 Criminals may underestimate the
risk of being caught because they are overconfident in their ability to
avoid detection or because they are risk seekers. Second, criminals may
discount the severity of punishment, particularly if it occurs long after
the misconduct.42 A perpetrator fears criminal sanctions imposed
tomorrow more than she does sanctions imposed in three or five years.
As such, delays in the imposition of punishment are likely to cause a
perpetrator to discount the impact of sanctions.43 This time-related
discounting of sanctions is also likely to diminish the deterrent effect of
additional penalties.44
Both the subjective evaluation of risk, which affects certainty,
and sanctions discounting, which affects severity, limit the efficacy of
deterrence. But, whereas the latter can be addressed through
alterations to the legal framework, the former is idiosyncratic.
Individuals’ risk assessments are important to consider in aiming to
achieve deterrence, but liability regimes cannot be tailored to such
persons because, simply put, they may be beyond deterrence.
Sanctions discounting, on the other hand, is attributable to the
time lapse between misconduct and prosecution, and it is possible to
address this issue through changes to the legal framework. Delays in
the identification and prosecution of wrongdoers are common with
regards to market manipulation. These crimes are often complex, and
the legal framework makes it difficult for regulators and private
plaintiffs to prove liability, thereby likely resulting in sanctions
will always make a stronger impression.” (quoting Cesare Beccaria, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
58 (David Young trans., Hackett Publ’g. Co. 1986) (1764))).
40. See Kimberly N. Varma & Anthony N. Doob, Deterring Economic Crimes: The Case of Tax
Evasion, 40 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 165, 167 (1998) (“Deterrence theory assumes that there
are intelligent, informed individuals who calculate the costs and benefits (perceived or actual) of
undertaking one choice or another.”).
41. See Thomas A. Loughran, Raymond Paternoster, Alex R. Piquero & Greg Pogarsky, On
Ambiguity in Perceptions of Risk: Implications for Criminal Decision Making and Deterrence, 49
CRIMINOLOGY 1029, 1029–30 (2011) (discussing how an individual’s perceived certainty of
punishment impacts the relative deterrent effect of that punishment).
42. Paternoster, supra note 27, at 820 (“[Scholars have] argued that in order to be effective
in offsetting the perceived benefits of crime, punishment must come soon after the offense.”).
43. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION: RECONSIDERING THE
PROSPECT OF SANCTION 11 (2009) (explaining how individuals measure the risk associated with
committing a crime and how the estimation decreases the longer they are not sanctioned for
committing a certain crime).
44. See id. (establishing that individuals’ underestimation of punishment undermines the
deterrent objective of punishment).
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discounting and diminished deterrence. For example, the Flash Crash
occurred in 2010, but it was not until 2015 that the CFTC and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) identified Navinder Singh Sarao
as the perpetrator, and it took another three years to successfully
prosecute Sarao.45
Given sanctions discounting, many deterrence scholars focus on
making changes to liability frameworks in ways that increase the
certainty of punishment rather than the severity of sanctions.46
Enhancing certainty can reduce the time delays that result in sanctions
discounting, thereby making sanctions more effective.47 And
emphasizing certainty is likely to have a greater deterrent effect on
risk-seeking or overconfident criminals than would harsher sanctions.48
Further, beyond sanctions discounting and risk evaluation, in
comparing the relative effectiveness of severity versus certainty on
achieving deterrence, certainty has been found to have a stronger
deterrent effect.49 This is true not only because there is a greater
objective likelihood of getting caught, but also because of its impact on

45. See Matt Levine, Guy Trading at Home Caused the Flash Crash, BLOOMBERG OP. (Apr.
21, 2015, 5:37 PM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-04-21/guy-trading-athome-caused-the-flash-crash [https://perma.cc/UL2Q-EHCU] (explaining how Navinder Sarao’s
spoofing strategy caused the Flash Crash); Margot Patrick, ‘Flash Crash’ Trader Navinder Sarao
Worked with Fund Network Now Under Investigation, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 17, 2015, 3:54 AM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/flash-crash-trader-navinder-sarao-worked-with-fund-network-nowunder-investigation-1434527646 [https://perma.cc/SQ8K-RY8H] (explaining the strategy Sarao
used that led to the Flash Crash); CFTC v. Sarao Futures Ltd., No. 15-cv-3398, 2016 WL 8257513
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2016) (discussing Sarao’s manipulating scheme and holding Sarao liable for
engaging in spoofing).
46. See, e.g., Samuel Cameron, The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and
Evidence, 41 KYKLOS 301, 306 (1988) (explaining that the degree of certainty of punishment is
essential to deter crime and arguing that severity of punishment is ineffective if the individual
believes he will not be punished); see also KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 16 (“The higher the
chance of getting caught, and the higher the associated costs, the less likely that crime will
be committed.”).
47. See Mark A. Cohen, The Economics of Crime and Punishment: Implications for
Sentencing of Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 503, 514–15
(2000) (providing empirical evidence that criminals are more deterred by certain punishment than
severe sanctions).
48. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of
Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1999) (“For risk-preferring
individuals, the severity of imprisonment sanctions has a lesser effect on deterrence than the
probability of sanctions . . . .”).
49. See Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 29, at 865 (“[P]unishment certainty is far more
consistently found to deter crime than is punishment severity, and the extralegal consequences of
crime seem at least as great a deterrent as do the legal consequences.”); VALERIE WRIGHT, SENT’G
PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF
PUNISHMENT
4
(2010),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/
Deterrence-in-Criminal-Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLG3-KF5M] (“Criminological research over
several decades and in various nations generally concludes that enhancing the certainty of
punishment produces a stronger deterrent effect than increasing the severity of punishment.”).
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public perception with respect to certainty of punishment.50 As an
individual either (1) breaks the law and successfully avoids detection or
punishment, or (2) witnesses others being successful in their criminal
activities, she may perceive a decrease in the probability that she will
be caught and punished for her misdeeds. 51 But if she witnesses others
being caught, a would-be perpetrator may evaluate that there is a
strong likelihood that she will be detected and, therefore, refrain from
engaging in misconduct.
While not all forms of crime can be meaningfully analyzed under
deterrence theory, monetary crimes, such as market manipulation, are
amenable to the theory.52 Manipulation involves planning, reasoning,
and having an awareness of how the markets work. Indeed, in
discussing manipulation, regulators often frame their efforts in terms
that presume a defendant calculates the profitability of her schemes,
crafting regulatory responses aimed at altering that calculus.53
1. Deterrence & Uncertainty
To fully appreciate the role certainty plays in deterrence, it is
necessary to unpack how uncertainty may arise in a legal framework.
There are two primary forms of uncertainty that may diminish the
deterrent effect of a liability framework. First, there may be legal
uncertainty as to whether the perpetrator’s conduct is illegal.54
Imprecise and unwieldly laws that claim to proscribe everything
ultimately deter very little or, in some cases, nothing at all.55 Further,
to the extent similar conduct may result in dissimilar penalties, legal
uncertainty hampers deterrence. Deterrence theory presumes that a
50. See Paternoster, supra note 27, at 785 (explaining how “perceptual properties of
punishment” affect deterrence).
51. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 11 (describing this as the “experiential effect,” where, “as
time passes, many people come to lower their estimates of the risks of offending ,” and “as
offenders commit crimes and escape sanction, or see others do so, they adjust their risk
estimates downward”).
52. Baer, supra note 31, at 1309.
53. See Anti-manipulation and Anti-fraud Final Rules Fact Sheet, COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/document
s/file/amaf_factsheet_final.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/W64F-QKH4]. When
filing complaints against market manipulation, the SEC will request both civil fines and
disgorgement of any gains from market manipulation, including prejudgement interest. See, e.g.,
Final Judgement as to Defendant Howard M. Appel at 4, SEC v. Appel, No. 18-cv-3200-PD (E.D.
Pa. May 10, 2019), ECF No. 11 (“Defendant is liable for disgorgement . . . together with
prejudgment interest . . . .”).
54. See Baer, supra note 31, at 1313 (“[C]ritics of deterrence theory contend that most
individuals are unaware of, or lack the ability to understand, complex legal rules.”).
55. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, On the Prospects of Deterring Corporate Crime, 2 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 25, 28–30 (2007) (“In prohibiting everything, vague and broad criminal laws
prohibit nothing.”).
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criminal knows her conduct is illegal;56 if she does not know that her
conduct violates the law, she lacks the knowledge necessary to assess
the costs and benefits stemming from her conduct.
The problematic effect of this form of uncertainty on deterrence
is one of overdeterrence of honest actors but underdeterrence of
criminals. For honest, risk-averse individuals who fear being punished,
legal uncertainty presents too great a risk to warrant continued
participation in the markets and, as such, they prefer to exit to
minimize the probability of punishment.57 On the other hand, under an
uncertain legal regime, bad actors may proliferate as they rely on the
existing ambiguities to defend their conduct and evade punishment.
Many have written about the confusion and ambiguities that
plague securities and commodities anti-manipulation laws.58 Neither
the Exchange Act nor the CEA defines manipulation,59 and in some
instances, the laws diverge in how to treat manipulative conduct.60 As
56. Baer, supra note 31, at 1310 (“Deterrence theory presumes that criminals know they are
violating the law.”).
57. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 34, at 995 (“Even when the probability of punishment
is less than one, if that probability declines as defendants take more care, then defendants may
tend to overcomply.”); Rose, supra note 33, at 2190:
The bottom line is that lawmakers face a clear tradeoff in setting sanctions: set
sanctions high in an effort to deter more fraud, but risk increasing overdeterrence costs,
or set them low to minimize overdeterrence costs, but risk increasing the incidence of
fraud. If we assume, as seems reasonable, that those inclined to commit fraud are more
likely to be risk seeking, whereas those inclined to obey the law are more likely to be
risk averse, the tradeoff in sanction setting becomes even starker.
58. See e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627,
653 (2002) (taking issue with the “strong inference” pleading standard to prove scienter under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act as there is no “precise definition” of the standard and it
had at “least three different articulations”); Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law:
A (Very) Critical Analysis and a Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 1013 (1994)
(describing the state of commodity market manipulation law as “extraordinarily misguided” due
to its confusing and contradictory nature and thus creating “[a] law [that] is less a deterrent to
manipulators than [it is] an invitation to them”).
59. Fischel & Ross, supra note 23, at 506 (highlighting that despite having “the prevention of
manipulation as [their] primary goal . . . neither the Securities Exchange Act nor the Commodity
Exchange Act attempts to define [manipulation]”); Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of
Commodity Futures Prices—The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REGUL. 281, 313 (1991)
(stating that the “Commodity Exchange Act did not define manipulation,” and so “the task of
interpretation was left to the courts and to another small agency within the Department of
Agriculture”); Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 346–48 (1987) (criticizing federal laws for prohibiting manipulation for over
sixty-five years while simultaneously failing to provide a proper definition, before exploring a
different perspective to determining manipulation based on “conduct that would be uneconomical
or irrational, absent an effect on market price”).
60. See Fletcher, supra note 8, at 484–86 (underscoring the difference between the
Commissions’ treatment of open-market manipulation as requiring only manipulative intent
and the courts’ treatment of open-market manipulation as requiring both intent and
“something more”).
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the schemes underlying market manipulation evolve, especially with
the increased utilization of algorithms and AI straddling the line
between legal and illegal conduct, the ambiguities in the antimanipulation framework challenge its effectiveness at deterring
manipulation. This is especially true for new, less understood forms of
market manipulation, such as algorithm-related distortion or
manipulation. Thus, in assessing the deterrent effect of the antimanipulation liability regime, one must consider whether and to what
extent the framework creates uncertainty as to the legality of the
conduct in question.
Second, there may be legal uncertainty with respect to the
capacity of the state to successfully prosecute a criminal. This
uncertainty differs from legal ambiguity in that its focus is on the
government’s capabilities to prosecute, which would include its
resources, the burdens of proof it faces, and any evidentiary hurdles the
legal regime requires prior to imposing liability. In considering the
certainty of punishment, deterrence theory places emphasis on
identification of wrongdoing and government willingness to prosecute
perpetrators.61 Per this line of reasoning, if the government can identify
and is willing to prosecute wrongdoing, then there is certainty of
punishment. Even if the two criteria are met, however, there may be
uncertainty of punishment if the state is unable to prosecute. 62 For
example, the state may be ill-equipped to bring charges due to limited
resources. Similarly, if the legal regime renders the misconduct
effectively beyond prosecution because of near-impossible standards of
proof and evidentiary burdens, then the deterrent effect of the liability
framework will be muted.63
There is intense legal debate as to whether the antimanipulation legal regime needlessly hampers the ability of regulators
to prosecute market manipulation. Indeed, one scholar has described
manipulation in the commodities market as an “unprosecutable” crime
because of the significant burdens imposed on the state to hold traders
liable.64 For example, as traders outmaneuver and outspend regulators
61. See Baer, supra note 31, at 1344–45 (discussing how the government’s increased efforts
to prosecute crime has a deterrent effect on wrongdoers).
62. See id. at 1343 (explaining that an increase in allocation of resources is necessary for an
increased probability of detection).
63. See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 111–17 (4th ed. 2017)
(explaining how courts have not established clear standards for certain elements for crimes under
the Securities Laws, thus resulting in highly contested cases).
64. See Markham, supra note 59, at 357 (“[W]here a gross manipulation occurs, the
government is still faced with the imposing burden of proving that the price was artificial and that
the trader was attempting to create an artificial price rather than exploiting a market situation
based upon natural forces.”).
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on trading technology, a public sense of uncertainty may develop as to
whether the state can effectively restrict manipulative and disruptive
practices that exploit technological innovations. In turn, this
contributes to an overall perception that both the regulators are weak
and that manipulation is rampant is the markets. 65 Thus, the limited
resources of regulators become a source of uncertainty that impedes
deterrence of market manipulation. In sum, the efficacy of the liability
regime in deterring misconduct depends on the tools and resources that
the state has at its disposal to prosecute. A legal enforcer weakened by
burdensome standards of proof and limited resources does not serve as
an effective deterrent to misconduct.
2. The Limits of Emphasizing Severity
Deterrence theory seeks to increase the cost of misconduct to
potential perpetrators by increasing the certainty of punishment and
the severity of sanctions. In keeping with the broader trend in the U.S.
criminal justice system of preferring severity over certainty in deterring
criminal conduct,66 lawmakers and the Commissions have focused their
efforts to deter market manipulation on increasingly harsher
penalties.67 Specifically, the Commissions have consistently increased
the size of monetary penalties levied against wrongdoers each year. For
example, in 2018, the SEC levied penalties totaling $1.439 billion,
almost doubling its 2017 penalties of $832 million.68 Similarly, the size
of the CFTC’s penalties has increased significantly in the past few
years. During 2016 and 2017, the CFTC had three judgments each year

65. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 8, at 493 (discussing the Enron and WorldCom corporate
frauds and their effect on market perception); Ana Carvajal & Jennifer Elliot, The Challenge of
Enforcement in Securities Markets: Mission Impossible? (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper
No. 09/168, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1457591 [https://perma.cc/
UH22-FHPY] (analyzing the effectiveness of market enforcement and its subsequent effects on
investors’ confidence in the market).
66. See, e.g., Kelli D. Tomlinson, An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?,
FED. PROB., Dec. 2016, at 33, 34 (“The United States has experienced an incarceration binge over
the last several decades; in 1980 there were approximately 501,886 incarcerated persons in prisons
and jails, and at year-end 2009 there were 2,284,913.”).
67. David M. Becker, What More Can Be Done to Deter Violations of the Federal Securities
Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1852 (2012).
68. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2018),
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R92-T76J]. To be
clear, this number represents penalties for all violations of the securities laws, not only market
manipulation cases.
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that totaled $10 million or more; in contrast, in 2018, the agency had
three times as many monetary judgments of that size. 69
The focus on severity is also evident in the enactment of
legislation granting the Commissions access to more severe sanctions
for market manipulation. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, granted
the SEC the authority to impose civil money penalties in administrative
proceedings.70 Prior to this amendment, the SEC was required to seek
civil money penalties from a federal district court and, thus, was limited
in the sanctions it could seek in administrative proceedings.71 Further,
the Dodd-Frank Act increased the penalty amounts that the SEC could
impose in these proceedings by fifty percent.72 With respect to the
CFTC, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the agency to impose civil
penalties equal to the greater of one million dollars or treble damages
for violations of its anti-manipulation provisions.73 In adjudicating
market manipulation cases, the courts likewise focus on severity of
sanctions to deter future misconduct. In their sentencing, courts favor
stricter, harsher punishments for market manipulators, altering the
costs of the crime relative to its benefits, and thereby promoting
deterrence.74 As one court stated, market manipulation “when detected,
must be heavily punished if deterrence is to be achieved.”75

69. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DIVISION
ENFORCEMENT 9 (2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11/ENFAnnualReport
111418_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ9Q-BWDM]. Again, this number represents all penalties for
violations of commodities laws, not only market manipulation cases.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a)(1).
71. Gideon Mark, SEC and CFTC Administrative Proceedings, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 45,
46 (2016):
Prior to Dodd-Frank, the SEC’s authority to impose civil penalties in an administrative
proceeding (“AP”) was limited to registered entities and persons associated with
registered entities . . . . For all other defendants the SEC was required to file a civil
enforcement action in federal court. One consequence of this limitation was that the
SEC historically commenced only 60% of its new cases as APs.
72. Compare Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-429, § 101(d)(2)(a), 104 Stat. 931, 932 (1990) (amending section 20 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t, to include a $5,000 maximum penalty for individuals), with Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(g)(2)(A), 124 Stat.
1376, 1862 (2010) (increasing the penalty against individuals to $7,500).
73. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 753(a) (amending
the Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 15, to expand the CFTC’s authority
to pursue anti-manipulation violations); id. (outlining the range of penalties for antimanipulation violations).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Castaldi, 743 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The judge
addressed deterrence, both specific and general, and said that a Guideline sentence would not be
adequate as a deterrent to this crime. . . . As noted, the sentence was the longest possible under
the plea agreement: maximum consecutive sentences for a total of 276 months (twenty-three years)
in prison”).
75. Reddy v. CFTC, 191 F.3d 109, 127 (2d Cir. 1999).
OF

2021]

MANIPULATIVE INTENT OF ALGORITHMS

277

This focus on severity, however, is misplaced and ineffective
against misconduct such as market manipulation. Empirical research
supports this, finding that there is little to no deterrent effect resulting
from harsher penalties.76 Indeed, according to research, harsher
penalties may erode the deterrent effect of a liability regime by making
sanctions less stigmatizing;77 reducing conviction rates;78 and, even,
increasing crime.79 In the financial markets, the emphasis on severity
has likely done little to deter manipulation.
Public perception of the Commissions is that they are weak and
ineffective, especially in safeguarding the markets against
manipulation.80 Indeed, despite the steady increase in monetary
sanctions for market manipulation, some have accused the
Commissions of being too lenient against defendants. For example, the
SEC often allows defendants to pay a fine while neither admitting nor
denying wrongdoing.81 Similarly, in one of its first spoofing cases, the
CFTC banned Michael Coscia from trading for only one year, which
some saw as too lenient given the severity of the crime.82 Thus, even
with increased sanctions against defendants, the Commissions are not

76. See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime:
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143 (2003) (explaining that more severe
sentences are not more effective than less severe sentences in reducing crime).
77. Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century,
23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 22 (1998) (“For an event to be stigmatizing it must be relatively uncommon.”).
78. Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1185 (2004) (“High penalties, instead of increasing conviction rates, may
decrease them. As penalties increase, people may not be as willing to enforce them because of the
disproportionate impact on those caught.”).
79. Tomislav V. Kovandzic, John J. Sloan, III & Lynne M. Vieraitis, “Striking out” as Crime
Reduction Policy: The Impact of “Three Strikes” Laws on Crime Rates in U.S. Cities, 21 JUST. Q.
207, 207, 234 (2004).
80. See, e.g., Dennis Kelleher, How the SEC Let Wall Street Run Wild, POLITICO (Dec. 12,
2015, 7:23 AM EST), https://www.politico.com/agenda/how-the-sec-let-wall-street-run-wild000004 [https://perma.cc/N83S-TT75] (“Today, the SEC is failing to enforce the law and write
regulations to deal with the profound flaws in our markets that create dangerous instability and
harm everyday investors. . . . Enforcement of delinquent-filing actions does not deter market
manipulation, major fraud and other serious misconduct at our largest financial institutions.”); see
also MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 200–01 (2014) (attributing the drop in
stock ownership to the notion that the market is unfair).
81. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Responding to Critics, S.E.C. Defends ‘No Wrongdoing’
Settlements, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 23, 2012, 5:17 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/02/22/s-e-c-chairwoman-defends-settlement-practices/ [https://perma.cc/9AC6-FWBN] (“The
[SEC] frequently settles cases . . . by allowing a Wall Street firm to pay a fine . . . . The settlements
usually do not require the defendants to admit any wrongful conduct. . . . Some people have
questioned [the] deterrent effect and the value of relying on the “neither admit nor deny” clause.”).
82. Press Release, Bart Chilton, Comm’r, CFTC, Concurring Statement of Comm’r
Bart Chilton in the Matter of Panther Energy Trading LLC and Michael J.
Coscia (July 22, 2013), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement072
213 [https://perma.cc/7AHL-YG2F].
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viewed as effective regulators, thereby minimizing the deterrence of the
regulatory regime.
While these critiques of the Commissions appear to be debates
over the severity or leniency of sanctions, the undercurrent in the
conversation is one of certainty. Although the Commissions are
increasing their sanctions, these higher sanctions are less impactful
given the lack of certainty of punishment for manipulation. Ensuring
certainty of punishment, therefore, ought to be the Commissions’
principal focus to enhance deterrence of manipulation in the markets.
B. The Benefits of Deterrence for Financial Markets
Manipulation undermines the fundamental purpose of the
financial markets—efficient capital allocation.83 Manipulation weakens
market efficiency by injecting inaccurate information into the markets
and undermines investor protection, causing investors to exit the
markets. Deterrence is key to limiting the pernicious effects of
manipulation on the financial markets. An effective deterrence
framework minimizes the consequences of manipulation, resulting in
two overarching benefits for the market: enhanced market efficiency
and greater investor protection. Deterrence, therefore, is at the core of
financial regulators’ goals in overseeing and regulating the markets.
1. Enhanced Market Efficiency
Markets are efficient when they quickly incorporate available
information into prices.84 The two primary market characteristics that
contribute to market efficiency are price accuracy and liquidity.85 Price
accuracy refers to the reliability of a price as a reflection of the
fundamental value of an asset.86 Liquidity refers to the ready
availability of other traders with whom to trade.87 The more liquid a
market is, the easier it is for a trader to execute transactions without

83. See Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets,
68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1631 (2015) (“Efficiency in processing information can, in theory at least,
also help foster better allocation of capital in securities markets, so-called allocative efficiency.”).
84. Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 (2003) (“[A] market is ‘efficient’ when prices always fully reflect
available information.”).
85. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 490.
86. Id. at 490–91.
87. Douglas J. Elliott, Market Liquidity: A Primer, BROOKINGS INST. 3 (2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Market-Liquidity.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QVA9-J6QT] (explaining that liquidity emerges from ease of transactions based on time restraints,
minimal transaction costs, and potential buyers willing to pay theoretical market value).
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significant market movement.88 Greater market liquidity increases
price accuracy and market efficiency as it allows traders to more easily
reveal information through their transactions. Decreased liquidity
reduces market efficiency because traders that cannot readily transact
are likely to discount the value of an asset to account for this reality.
Manipulation undercuts these two pillars of market efficiency by
distorting informational efficiency of the markets. As to price accuracy,
manipulation corrupts the information reflected in the price of an asset,
thereby making the price less accurate. Manipulation schemes inject
inaccurate information into the markets, which causes asset prices to
deviate from their fundamental value.89 Thus, a trader’s ability to alter
pricing data on which the market relies negatively impacts market
efficiency and contributes to capital misallocation within the markets.
Relatedly, in the face of manipulation, market liquidity also
diminishes. As traders realize that asset prices are inaccurate, they
may withdraw from the market to protect themselves from being on the
losing end of a manipulative trade.90 The resulting illiquidity is akin to
a tax on the markets that discourages honest traders from
participating, further divorcing the market price of the asset from its
fundamental value. Effective deterrence of manipulation, therefore,
improves market efficiency by reducing the impact of market
misconduct on the accuracy of asset pricing and the liquidity of
the markets.
2. Greater Investor Protection
A familiar mechanism associated with investor protection is the
mandatory disclosure system, which undergirds much of the financial
regulatory system.91 Along with required disclosures, investor
88. See id. (discussing how liquid markets allow for assets to be sold quickly before a
significant price movement can occur).
89. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711, 730 (2006) (“The larger the deviation between price and value and the longer it
takes for prices to revert to value, the less efficient the market is.”); Steve Thel, Regulation of
Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices and the Text of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 398 (“Prices may change in response to false or misleading
communications since security prices reflect what investors believe, even if those beliefs
are wrong.”).
90. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Engineered Credit Default Swaps: Innovative or Manipulative?,
94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1073, 1113 (2019) (“Engineered CDS transactions decrease the liquidity of the
CDS market because traders are likely to withdraw from the markets owing to the decreased
utility of CDS as risk mitigation tools.”).
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (requiring a publicly traded company to give annual disclosures of
the firm’s “financial condition, changes in financial condition, [and] results of operations”). The
SEC has created other rules that require disclosures on a quarterly basis and after any material
changes in the firm’s financial condition or operations. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2019) (requiring
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protection also extends to safeguarding market participants from
abuses, such as fraud, misstatements, and manipulation.92 Ensuring
that dishonest or unscrupulous traders do not exploit other market
participants for profit is paramount to the market’s viability. To the
extent investors doubt the integrity of the market or doubt that
regulators cannot protect them from abuses, they are unlikely to invest
their capital in the markets.93 Or, should they choose to invest, they will
discount the price of assets being sold to account for the possibility of
market abuses.94 Thus, investor protection through the deterrence of
market distortion is a central goal of the anti-manipulation framework.
II. MODERN MARKETS, MODERN MANIPULATION
The financial markets have evolved significantly in recent years
with the rise of technology and innovation. The result is not only a
change in how the financial markets operate, but also the development
of trading techniques and strategies that exploit technological advances
to the detriment of the markets. Yet, despite these technological
advances, the law of market manipulation is largely unchanged since it
was enacted in the 1930s. The twofold consequences of the law’s failure
to evolve are that the regulatory framework is ill-equipped to address
novel developments in the financial markets and the law fails to
effectively deter misconduct.
This Part examines the contours of the existing legal and
regulatory framework of market manipulation, highlighting the
standards of proof necessary to hold someone liable for manipulation.
Next, it examines the different ways in which technology is used in
trading, specifically discussing algorithmic trading, high-frequency
trading, and artificial intelligence in the financial markets. Lastly, this
quarterly transition reports, called Form 10-Qs); 17 CFR § 249.308 (2019) (requiring reports of any
material changes, called Form 8-Ks). Additionally, when first going public, a company is required
to give detailed disclosures in its registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)–(b) (outlining
registration requirements); 17 CFR § 239.11 (2020) (providing Form S-1 as the form for
registration statements).
92. 1 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 4 (7th ed. 2018).
93. This is a classic “lemons market,” as first described by George Akerlof. According to
Akerlof, in a market in which buyers do not know which cars are worth their asking price and
which are not (that is, the lemons), the buyer will simply treat all cars like lemons. The result will
be that worthy car sellers will leave the markets, unable to get an accurate price for their products,
and lemon sellers will remain in the market. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 48 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970).
94. See Dionigi Gerace, Charles Chew, Christopher Whittaker & Paul Mazzola, Stock Market
Manipulation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 8 AUSTRALASIAN ACCT. BUS. & FIN. J. 105, 136
(2014) (“Manipulation is . . . associated with . . . reduced volume as investors exit the market
rationally in fear of trading with a manipulator.”).
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Part examines possible examples of algorithmic manipulation
as a precursor to later analysis of the limitations of the antimanipulation framework.
A. The Existing Anti-Manipulation Framework
Jurisdiction over market manipulation is principally divided
between the SEC and the Exchange Act on the one hand, and the CFTC
and the CEA on the other. Owing to markets being traditionally humandominated, anti-manipulation provisions in the Exchange Act and the
CEA primarily center liability on the mental state of the actor. This
Part examines four anti-manipulation provisions most applicable to
algorithmic trading, highlighting the mental state required for each.
1. Price Manipulation
Price manipulation is proscribed under both Exchange Act
section 9(a)(2) and CEA sections 6(c)(3) and 9(a)(2). Under the Acts, to
prove price manipulation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the
defendant had the ability to influence prices, (2) an artificial price
existed, (3) the defendant caused the artificial price, and (4) the
defendant specifically intended to cause the artificial price.95 Courts
have indicated that, under the Exchange Act, evidence that the
defendant specifically intended to manipulate the price is unnecessary;
instead, a defendant may be liable if it can be proven that she willfully
engaged in the misconduct underlying the violation.96 But to hold a
defendant liable for price manipulation under the CEA, the CFTC must
prove that the accused acted with the specific intent to create an

95. In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2013); CFTC v.
Wilson, 27 F. Supp. 3d 517, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Fletcher, supra note 8, at 500–01
(discussing the elements of the price manipulation standard).
96. “Manipulative purpose” is a required element to prove manipulative practice under
section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78i. Under the penalty provisions of the Exchange
Act, liability attaches when a person “willfully violates [the statute].” 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has interpreted this language not to
necessitate proof of intent to specifically violate the Exchange Act, but rather the intent to willfully
commit the act constituting the violation, and other courts have followed suit. United States v.
Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d. Cir. 1972); see, e.g., United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670,
711 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (applying the Second Circuit’s interpretation to not require proof of intent to
violate the Exchange Act); United States v. Erikson, 601 F.2d 296, 304 n.12 (7th Cir. 1979) (“No
proof of specific intent to violate the securities laws is necessary.” (citing Schwartz, 464 F.2d at
509)). See infra Section II.A.2 for a discussion of the challenges of the recklessness standard.
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artificial price that does not reflect legitimate forces of supply
and demand.97
The specific intent standard is a particularly high standard to
meet and has resulted in the CFTC not litigating many price
manipulation cases. Indeed, because of the exacting burden of proof
imposed on the plaintiff to prove price manipulation, the CFTC, in its
forty-year history, has managed to successfully prosecute only one price
manipulation case.98 In an algorithmic world, it is questionable whether
the price manipulation provision can meaningfully capture anything
other than the most egregious misconduct in the markets given the high
mental state requirement.
2. Fraud-Based Manipulation
The most widely used anti-manipulation provision is Exchange
Act section 10(b) and its accompanying Rule 10b-5.99 Together, they
provide the SEC with a broad basis to regulate most forms of abusive
market behavior. A successful section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 action
requires the plaintiff to show that (1) the defendant made a material
misstatement or defrauded another party, (2) she committed these
actions intentionally, (3) her actions were related to a securities sale or
purchase, (4) the plaintiff or the markets in general relied on the
misstatement or fraudulent conduct, and (5) the plaintiff was
harmed.100 In 2010, the CFTC was granted similar anti-fraud authority
under CEA section 6(c)(1), which mirrors Exchange Act section 10(b).
Per CEA section 6(c)(1), the CFTC enacted Rule 180.1, which is
identical to Rule 10b-5 in all material respects, signaling
the incorporation of decades of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence
and interpretation.101
Under Rules 10b-5 and 180.1, to hold a defendant liable, the
Commissions or private plaintiffs must show that the defendant acted

97. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,408 (July 14,
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).
98. Shaun D. Ledgerwood & Paul R. Carpenter, A Framework for the Analysis of Market
Manipulation, 8 REV. L. & ECON. 253, 254 (2012) (noting that Bart Chilton, commissioner of the
CFTC, admitted that “in 35 years, there has been only one successful prosecution [DiPlacido v.
CFTC] for manipulation”).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019).
100. See, e.g., ATSI Commc’n, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 2007).
101. The CFTC’s incorporation of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence has been explicit:
Given the similarities between CEA section 6(c)(1) and Exchange Act section 10(b), the
[CFTC] deems it appropriate and in the public interest to model final Rule 180.1 on
SEC Rule 10b-5. To account for the differences between the securities markets and
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either intentionally or recklessly.102 While the Supreme Court has never
decided whether the scienter requirement encompasses recklessness,
every federal appellate court has held that recklessness is sufficient,
although the level of recklessness varies across the circuits.103 Courts
have defined recklessness to be conduct that “departs so far from the
standards of ordinary care that it is very difficult to believe the [actor]
was not aware of what he was doing.”104 To meet the recklessness
standard, the Commissions or private plaintiffs must demonstrate a
strong inference of scienter, either by showing that the defendant had
the motive and opportunity to manipulate or through strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior.105
Rule 10b-5 is the workhorse of the anti-manipulation
framework, providing the basis for the majority of the antimanipulation cases brought by the Commissions and private plaintiffs.
Despite its recency, the same is expected of Rule 180.1 given that it
greatly expands the CFTC’s manipulation authority and is closely
modeled on Rule 10b-5.106 Although the scienter requirement for Rules
derivatives markets, the [CFTC] will be guided, but not controlled, by the substantial
body of judicial precedent applying the comparable language of SEC Rule 10b-5.
Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive
Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399 (citation omitted).
102. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007):
We have previously reserved the question whether reckless behavior is sufficient for
civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Every Court of Appeals that has considered
the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by showing that
the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, though the Circuits differ on the degree
of recklessness required.
(citation omitted); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1980) (“[W]e hold that the Commission is
required to establish scienter as an element of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of
§ 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated under that section
of the 1934 Act.”).
103. See, e.g., Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(quoting First Commodity Corp. v. CFTC, 676 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1982)); City of Dearborn Heights
Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Waters Corp., 632 F.3d 751, 757 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting the
definition of recklessness from Sundstrand Corp v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.
1977)); Gebhart v. SEC, 595 F.3d 1034, 1041–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that reckless conduct that
constitutes scienter is an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care, and it presents a
danger of misleading buyers or sellers that the defendant knew or must have known about); S.
Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2009) (same); Flaherty &
Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 2009) (same);
Institutional Invs. Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 267 n.42 (3d Cir. 2009) (same).
104. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 850 F.2d at 748 (alteration in original) (quoting First
Commodity Corp., 676 F.2d at 7). See also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
105. Sharette v. Credit Suisse Int’l, 127 F. Supp. 3d. 60, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
106. Compare Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2020),
with Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019) (17 C.F.R.
§ 180.1 augments 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and clearly imitates 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5). See also Prohibition
on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and
Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,405 (explaining that the rule’s enforcement
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10b-5 and 180.1 is lower than that of price manipulation, recklessness
is not an easy standard to meet.107 With algorithmic trading, outside of
clear cases in which a programmer deliberately or carelessly programs
the algorithm to manipulate, it may be difficult to decipher from the
algorithm’s code whether the programmer had manipulative intent
(scienter) when she coded the algorithm. Thus, even with a lower
scienter requirement, Rules 10b-5 and 180.1 may still pose challenges
for regulators in proscribing some forms of algorithmic manipulation.
3. Open-Market Manipulation
Rules 10b-5 and 180.1 are also utilized in sanctioning openmarket manipulation. Open-market manipulation refers to
manipulation accomplished through facially legitimate transactions.108
Given that there is no per se fraud or misconduct in this form of market
manipulation, courts have historically looked to the intent of the trader
to determine whether the underlying conduct ought to be deemed
manipulative. For example, short selling or heavy trading at the end of
the trading day (marking the close) can be used to improperly distort
prices but may also constitute a legitimate investment strategy
depending on the goals of the investor. For most courts, liability for
open-market manipulation turns on proof of the defendant’s intent to
manipulate the markets even with legitimate transactions.109
Part of the difficulty with open-market manipulation is that
although liability arises from a violation of Rule 10b-5, courts have
traditionally required proof that the defendant acted intentionally to
manipulate the markets; recklessness is insufficient in these cases.110
would “be guided, but not controlled by, judicial precedent interpreting and applying scienter
under Exchange Act section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b–5”).
107. See Gregory Scopino, Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price of
Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for Improper Trading Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 67
FLA. L. REV. 221, 252 (2015) (“[T]he mental state requirements of many causes of actions could
pose an insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs in private lawsuits and the CFTC in civil
enforcement actions.”).
108. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 484.
109. See, e.g., Koch v. SEC, 793 F.3d 147, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977)) (finding that there is no requirement for “the SEC to prove actual
market impact, as opposed to intent to affect the market, before finding liability for manipulative
trading practices”).
110. See, e.g., Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 865 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating
that liability for open-market manipulation required a showing of specific intent); see also David
Yeres, Robert Houck & Brendan Stuart, A Bridge Too Far, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2019, 5:20 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1113505/a-bridge-too-far-cftc-s-reckless-manipulation-theory
[https://perma.cc/72WH-WESK] (analyzing cases applying Rule 10b-5 to open-market
manipulation to argue that more than recklessness is needed to hold a defendant liable). But it
should be noted that in adopting Rule 180.1, the CFTC asserted that intentional or reckless
conduct is sufficient to create liability for open-market manipulation. Response and Incorporated
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This raises the evidentiary burden for the Commissions and private
plaintiffs who must demonstrate that the defendant had manipulative
intent when she engaged in her facially legitimate trades. For example,
to be liable for open-market manipulation in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the plaintiff must prove that the intent
to manipulate was the sole intent underlying the transactions.111
Indeed, according to the court in SEC v. Masri, if the defendant had
both legitimate and manipulative motives for her trades, she
would not be liable for open-market manipulation if her trades were
facially legitimate.112
The high evidentiary requirement of open-market manipulation
limits the availability of this theory of manipulation as a basis of
liability for algorithmic manipulation in all but the most obvious cases.
To the extent algorithms employ facially legitimate transactions that
distort the markets, holding someone accountable in these instances
may prove difficult. This is particularly true in light of the difficulty the
Commissions have had in holding human traders liable for open-market
manipulation in the past.113
4. Spoofing
The most recent addition to the anti-manipulation framework is
the CFTC’s anti-spoofing authority. The Dodd-Frank Act amended the
CEA to prohibit “any trading, practice, or conduct . . . [that] is, is of the
character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, spoofing[,]” which
it defines as “bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer
before execution.”114 To aid the markets in understanding how the
newly enacted spoofing provision would apply, the CFTC issued
interpretative guidance to delineate the scope of the prohibition.115 In
the guidance, the CFTC identified four nonexhaustive examples of
behavior that it would classify as spoofing: (1) submitting or cancelling
orders to overload the quotation system, (2) submitting or cancelling
bids to impede another’s execution of trades, (3) submitting or
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 18–22, CFTC v. Kraft
Foods Grp., Inc., No. 1:15-cv-02881 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2020), ECF No. 64; see also Prohibition on the
Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition
on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399 (stating that Rule 180.1 can be violated by a showing
of reckless or intentional conduct).
111. SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 370–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
112. Id. at 372.
113. See CFTC v. Wilson, 27 F. Supp. 3d 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
114. Commodity Exchange Act § 4c(a)(5), 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5), amended by Dodd-Frank Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 747, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) (emphasis added).
115. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890 (May 28, 2013).
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cancelling orders to create a false appearance of market depth,
and (4) submitting or cancelling bids with the intent to create an
artificial price.116
Liability for spoofing attaches if the trader acted intentionally to
cancel the bid or offer—that is, the actor must have been more than
reckless for her actions to constitute spoofing.117 Notably, by tying
liability to the intent of the trader, the anti-spoofing prohibition
adheres to the intent-focused model of prior anti-manipulation
provisions, despite being directed towards a modern, algorithmdominated marketplace. In remaining tethered to an intent-centric
framework, the newly enacted spoofing laws may also be less effective
at deterring the very conduct they are aimed at proscribing.
*

*

*

As the above discussion demonstrates, the existing antimanipulation framework’s liability provisions are centered firmly
around the intent of the actor. In human-dominated markets, this focus
on intent was understandable. Modern financial markets, however, are
not human-centric. Computers and algorithms dominate the markets,
thereby challenging the efficacy of an intent-focused liability regime in
deterring manipulation in the modern marketplace. The following
Section discusses the involvement of algorithms in modern-day trading
and its impact on how the market functions.
B. Modern Trading
Algorithmic trading dominates the securities and commodities
markets, accounting for nearly sixty percent of all transactions in each
market.118 The development of technology has impacted the financial
markets significantly, allowing for faster transaction execution,
lowered costs, and greater efficiency in the markets overall. In
analyzing the consequences and implications of technology in the
markets, legal scholars have focused on algorithmic trading and high116. Id. at 31,896.
117. Id.
118. Chris Isidore, Machines Are Driving Wall Street’s Wild Ride, Not Humans, CNN: BUS.
(Feb. 6, 2018, 4:02 PM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/06/investing/wall-street-computersprogram-trading/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZQP3-BCK6] (“On a typical trading day, computers
account for 50% to 60% of market trades.”); Gregory Meyer, Nicole Bullock & Joe Rennison, How
High Frequency Trading Hit a Speed Bump, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/
content/d81f96ea-d43c-11e7-a303-9060cb1e5f44 [https://perma.cc/XUE3-6DPE] (graph depicting
high frequency trading constituting between approximately thirty and fifty-five percent of U.S.
equities volume from 2007 to 2017, respectively).
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frequency trading (“HF trading”). Although these are important
developments in the market, the next frontier in technology lies in the
integration of AI and machine learning in trading algorithms. This
Section examines early iterations of algorithmic trading, including HF
trading, and then assesses how AI and machine learning continue to
revolutionize trading.
1. Algorithmic Trading and HF Trading
Algorithmic trading refers to the use of preprogrammed
electronic instructions in trading securities or commodities. 119 Trading
algorithms are programmed to execute specific trading strategies based
on preset rules that inform the algorithm when and how to act. For
example, a simple trading algorithm could be programmed to buy five
thousand shares of Widget, Inc. if and when the shares are $150 per
share. Once the shares reach the desired price, the algorithm initiates
a purchase order for Widget shares, sending its order to an exchange or
electronic communication network for the desired purchase volume.
Yet, trading algorithms can also be much more complex—disseminating
upper and lower limits for transactions or changing trading strategies
based on newly released information.120
Notwithstanding this complexity, programmers are still
required to code these investment decisions into rules-based
instructions that the algorithm can follow as it trades in the markets.121
Programmers code trading algorithms to evaluate collected data, attach
value to the data, and decide how to trade to accomplish the overarching
trading strategy.122 Within the scope of their rules-based set of
instructions, algorithmic trading programs make decisions, such as
when to initiate buy and sell orders, the volume of the transaction, and

119. Johannes Prix, Otto Loistl & Michael Huetl, Algorithmic Trading Patterns in Xetra
Orders, 13 EUR. J. FIN. 717, 717 (2007).
120. TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REGULATORY I SSUES RAISED BY THE
IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 10 (July 2011),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf [https://perma.cc/758K-2YG3]:
In its simplest guise, algorithmic trading may just involve the use of a basic
algorithm . . . to feed portions of an order into the market at pre-set intervals to
minimise market impact cost. At its most complex, it may entail many algorithms that
are able to assimilate information from multiple markets . . . in fractions of a second.
121. RISHI K. NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO QUANTITATIVE AND HIGHFREQUENCY TRADING 8–9, 24–62 (2d ed. 2013).
122. Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1064
(2016) (showing that programmers institute trading strategies in particularized ways by: “(1)
collecting data for trading; (2) submitting orders/canceling orders; (3) establishing the price,
amount, and type of trades to make; (4) anticipating the impact of trading on future price changes;
(5) responding to unplanned events; and (6) determining when to stop trading”).
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the transaction’s timing. Further, these programs do so in response to
their analysis of the markets and expectations of market movements.123
Algorithms can internalize, assess, and respond to large quantities of
data faster than any human can, quickening the pace at which
transactions occur in the markets, but with little to no human
intervention after the algorithm has been deployed in the markets.
The speed at which algorithms execute transactions is a
hallmark feature of a subset of algorithmic trading programs, known as
HF trading. HF trading broadly refers to the rapid, high-volume
placement and cancellation of bids and offers to realize short-term
arbitrage profits.124 While there is no agreed-upon definition, common
features of HF trading include heavy reliance on algorithms and a focus
on speed.125 HF traders leverage technology, algorithms, and speed to
gain an advantage over other traders in the market. Indeed, the success
and profitability of HF traders is directly influenced by speed, that is,
the ability to execute transactions faster than others in the market.126
The importance of speed to HF trading means that traders expend
considerable capital and expertise to reduce the time it takes to trade
and maximize available information for profitability.127
123. Alain Chaboud, Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson & Clara Vega, Rise of the
Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market 1 (Bd. of Governors for the Fed.
Rsrv. Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion Paper No. 980, Oct. 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/ifdp/2009/980/ifdp980.pdf [https://perma.cc/F69R-Z3XS] (“In algorithmic trading (AT),
[traders’] computers directly interface with trading platforms, placing orders without immediate
human intervention. The computers observe market data and possibly other information at
very high frequency, and, based on a built-in algorithm, send back trading instructions, often
within milliseconds.”).
124. There is no agreed-upon definition of HF trading. In a 2010 concept release, the SEC
identified five general characteristics that can be used to identify HF trading:
(1) The use of extraordinarily high-speed and sophisticated computer programs for
generating, routing, and executing orders; (2) use of co-location services and individual
data feeds offered by exchanges and others to minimize network and other types of
latencies; (3) very short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions; (4) the
submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission; and (5)
ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying
significant, unhedged positions overnight).
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3606 (2010).
125. McGowan, supra note 2, ¶¶ 2–3 (finding that, at its core, HF trading uses an “algorithm
[to] make[ ] important decisions such as timing, price, or in many cases, executing the entire order
without human interaction” while “being smarter and faster than everyone else”).
126. Id. ¶ 16 (“The speed factor in trading is known as ‘latency’, and is an important component
of all high-frequency trading strategies.”).
127. See id.:
In order to turn a profit, HF traders have to flow information into their algorithms
microseconds faster than their competitors. Therefore, to remain competitive, HF
traders must constantly upgrade their computer systems to stay ahead of the pack. . . .
In the HF trading world, speed and the most innovative technology separate the
winners from the losers. The current trend in employee recruiting is to hire traders with
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HF trading strategies rely on algorithms to submit and route
trades to find and exploit arbitrage opportunities in the markets.128 The
predefined rules that govern an HF trading algorithm allow traders to
execute complex trades in response to newly disclosed information
ahead of slower traders in the market.129 HF trading relies on
algorithms to “analyze market data, organize trades based on preprogrammed instructions, access . . . trading center servers, and trade
execution benefits.”130 HF algorithm programming, therefore, must be
precise and detailed to effectively accomplish its trading goals. Once
deployed in the market, the profitability of HF trading algorithms
depends on being able to operate and make decisions in furtherance of
the underlying goal without human intervention. Thus, the rules on
which an HF trading algorithm is based at the outset are of
paramount importance, and deciphering the underlying motivations of
the programmer from these rules is essential to any liability for
market manipulation.
2. Artificial Intelligence & Machine Learning
Although HF trading algorithms currently dominate the
discourse on computerized trading, the very near future of algorithmic
trading lies with AI and machine-learning algorithms.131 The
development of sophisticated learning algorithms is occurring at an
accelerated speed throughout society. From speech recognition, to selfdriving cars, to smart home speakers like Alexa, artificially intelligent,
machine-learning algorithms are becoming more prevalent in everyday
life.132 And the financial markets are no different.
Algorithmic trading is evolving to incorporate sophisticated AI
and machine-learning tools and techniques that allow algorithms to

degrees in math and computer science from the top schools, many traders even with
PhD’s, in order to stay competitive.
128. Id. ¶ 3.
129. Id. ¶ 16.
130. Kristin N. Johnson, Regulating Innovations: High Frequency Trading in Dark Pools, 42
J. CORP. L. 833, 857 (2017).
131. GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., THE FUTURE OF COMPUTER TRADING IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 36 (2012), http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight [https://perma.cc/5UNDR894] (scroll down to and click on “Future of computer trading in financial markets: an
international perspective”) (“Since the late 1990s, researchers have also studied the use of
automated optimisation methods to design and improve [autonomous] adaptive trading
algorithms. . . . The use of these techniques in the finance industry looks likely to grow over the
next decade.”).
132. Bill Kleyman, Smart Things Everywhere: The Connected Future of 2025, DATA CTR.
FRONTIER (Aug. 21, 2018), https://datacenterfrontier.com/smart-things-everywhere-the-connectedfuture-of-2025 [https://perma.cc/RU93-GAQN]:
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dynamically learn from data, assess inputs, and incorporate new
information into their decisionmaking. As discussed above, traditional
trading algorithms, whether HF or not, are preprogrammed to operate
within set parameters to fulfill a predetermined trading trajectory or
strategy. Unlike traditional algorithmic trading programs, AI machinelearning algorithms have the capacity to learn from data and prior
decisions, truly minimizing human involvement in trading.133
With AI machine-learning algorithms, coders specify a goal or a
set of goals for the algorithm to achieve when solving a problem.134 The
algorithm is not given any rules for how to solve the problem at hand.
Rather, it may be given rules on how to learn or it may be left to figure
out how to solve the problem on its own through trial and error of
similar problems. In learning from the available data, AI machinelearning algorithms are able to fine-tune their own decisionmaking
through repeated practice on the provided data.135 Thus, these
algorithms are not merely executing preprogrammed instructions but,
instead, are dynamically learning and solving problems based on the
data available, eliminating the need for human involvement in
their processes.
Importantly, the solutions that AI machine-learning algorithms
provide may be beyond any results the coder considered or expected
when she programmed the algorithm. Because the algorithm learns by
making inferences, connections, and classifications from the data, the
output from the algorithm may not be evident even to the programmer
because of how the AI machine-learning algorithm learns. One popular
technique used in AI machine-learning algorithms is the
implementation of a neural network. Neural networks, particularly
deep learning models, utilize virtual neurons to identify patterns in the
data or make logical inferences and connections between data points.136
By 2025, “smart” will become the new normal. . . . [Much of our technological
experience] will involve cognitive systems that interact with the data that we generate,
creating new layers of data analysis across a range of industries, applications, and
scenarios. [International Data Corporation] estimates that the volume of analyzed data
that is “touched” by cognitive systems will grow by a factor of 100 to 1.4 zettabytes
in 2025.
133. Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L.
REV. 54, 68–69 (2019):
[T]oday, machine learning algorithms are trained on a body of data that is selected by
designers or by past human practices. This process is the “learning” element in machine
learning; the algorithm learns, for example, how to pair queries and results based on a
body of data that produced satisfactory pairs in the past.
134. Id. at 62–63.
135. Id. at 68–69.
136. For an overview of neural networks, see Victor Zhou, Machine Learning for
Beginners: An Introduction to Neural Networks, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Mar. 5, 2019),
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Deep networks of neurons work together to arrive at a solution or
decision based on an algorithm’s analysis and internalization of the
data. Oftentimes, it is not easy to discern why a deep neural network
produced a given output or solution because the algorithm’s
decisionmaking process is “intuitive.”137 To illustrate, the outputs of
preset algorithms can be retraced by walking backwards through the
preprogrammed rules. But neural networks significantly complicate
this retracing process as there are no clear steps or discernible reasons
for each decision in its “thinking.”138
The complexity underlying the operation of these AI machinelearning algorithms creates a “black box” problem, that is, “an inability
to fully understand an AI’s decision-making process and the inability to
predict the AI’s decisions or outputs.” 139 Being unable to explain the
outputs of the algorithm ex post limits the ability of humans to
understand how they operate or supervise their use. Further, with a
“strong black box,” ex post analysis and reverse engineering to
understand how and why the AI machine-learning algorithm came to
its decision is not possible.140 This renders the AI machine-learning
algorithm’s functioning opaque to human oversight and supervision. As
AI machine-learning algorithms are introduced into the financial
markets, questions arise as to the capacity of the regulatory framework
to prevent and deter market manipulation. Unlike the rules-based
criteria of HF algorithms, AI machine-learning algorithms learn and
make dynamic, intuitive decisions that challenge the scienter-focused
anti-manipulation regime.
C. Algorithmic Manipulation: Assessing the Possibilities
With the dominance of algorithmic trading, the concerns with
respect to manipulation have moved away from focusing on the
misconduct of human traders and instead towards detecting and
deterring algorithmic manipulation. As one academic has stated,
algorithmic manipulation schemes “can be undertaken much more
effectively with the aid of algorithmic precision” than traditional
https://towardsdatascience.com/machine-learning-for-beginners-an-introduction-to-neuralnetworks-d49f22d238f9 [https://perma.cc/H5RT-D99H].
137. Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and
Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 902 (2018) (“Because a neural network is learning from
experience, its decision-making process is likewise intuitive.”).
138. Id. at 902–03 (“No single neuron in these networks encodes a distinct part of the decisionmaking process. The thousands or hundreds of thousands of neurons work together to arrive at a
decision . . . [and] often what is encoded will not be intelligible to human beings.”).
139. Id. at 905.
140. Id. at 906.
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market manipulation schemes.141 This precision, coupled with the
automated and increasingly AI-nature of algorithmic trading, makes
algorithmic manipulation a particularly pernicious problem, both in the
market and for regulators. This Section analyzes potential examples of
how algorithmic manipulation may manifest in the markets.
1. The Easy Case: Deliberate Misuse of Algorithms
Programmers can code algorithms to deliberately distort and
disrupt the markets. For example, a trader can deliberately program an
algorithm to “spoof” the market. Spoofing captured the attention of
regulators and the public because of its role in the Flash Crash—the
almost one-thousand point fall and rebound of the Dow Jones Index that
destabilized the U.S. securities markets in May 2010.142 Since then,
regulators have brought numerous enforcement actions against traders
for spoofing in equities, precious metals, and other commodities.143
Statutorily, spoofing is defined as placing an order with the
intent to cancel prior to execution.144 Practically, spoofing is a distortive
trading strategy with a few steps. First, a trader places a large, nonbona fide order on one side of the market causing the market to move
in response to the trade. Second, after the market has moved, the trader
places a small bona fide order on the other side of the market. The
smaller bona fide order is filled at the artificial price, earning the trader
a profit. Third, the trader cancels the large order, ending the scheme.145
To use a concrete example: Shares of Widget Co. are trading at
$5.25/share. Sarah Spoofer enters a buy order for one thousand shares
of Widget Co. at $5.45/share. In response to the large buy order, the
price of Widget Co. increases to $5.40/share, at which point Sarah
141. Yadav, supra note 122, at 1069.
142. Owen Davis, Navinder Singh Sarao and the Flash Crash, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015,
12:39 PM), https://www.ibtimes.com/navinder-singh-sarao-flash-crash-why-financial-marketspoofing-so-hard-catch-even-1898716 [https://perma.cc/QPR3-267G ] (“On the day of the crash—
May 6, 2010—Sarao allegedly entered more than 32,000 orders to sell futures contracts, then
canceled the vast majority of them. The technique, known as spoofing, allegedly allowed Sarao to
profit from artificial price movements.”); see also Treanor, supra note 5 (“[D]espite the turbulent
start to the trading day, no one had expected the near 1,000-point dive in share prices.”).
143. See, e.g., CFTC v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (the CFTC alleged
that defendants were engaged in spoofing by placing large orders in the future contracts market,
with the intent to cancel before execution); CFTC v. Khara, No. 15 CV 03497, 2015 WL 2066257
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2015) (the CFTC alleged that defendants engaged in unlawful conduct in the gold
and silver futures markets by “bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer
before execution”).
144. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C).
145. See Lin, supra note 24, at 1289 (“Spoofing allows the initiating party to distort the
ordinary price discovery in the marketplace by placing orders with no intention of ever executing
them and merely for the purpose of manipulating honest participants in the marketplace.”).
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enters a second order to sell one hundred shares of Widget at
$5.40/share, earning her a profit of $0.15/share.
The above-described scheme nets Sarah $15 if done manually,
slowly, and only once. But if Sarah deploys HF trading algorithms to
execute the same scheme—repeatedly, at a high volume, and across
numerous asset classes—she increases the profitability of the trading
strategy exponentially.146 HF trading algorithms can be coded to place,
then cancel, large market-moving orders on one side of the market and
also submit orders on the other side of the market to benefit from the
subsequent price movement. In 2013, the CFTC and the DOJ brought
their first criminal spoofing case against Michael Coscia and his firm
Panther Energy Trading LLC (collectively, “Coscia”).147 Coscia deployed
two algorithmic trading programs across approximately twelve
different commodities markets to create an illusion of demand, thereby
enabling him to earn profits on smaller trades on the opposite side of
the market.148 According to prosecutors, with the aid of algorithmic
trading programs, Coscia netted $1.4 million in illegal profits in less
than three months.149
Similarly, but with more devastating consequences, Navinder
Sarao used algorithmic trading programs to flood the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange with orders to sell millions of dollars’ worth of
securities as part of his spoofing strategy.150 Sarao’s algorithms,
however, did more than just earn him illicit profits through depressing
the price of the security: the algorithm’s large sell order sent the
markets into a twenty-minute state of extreme volatility.151 In that brief
146. Id. at 1289.
147. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Panther Energy
Trading LLC and Its Principal Michael J. Coscia to Pay $2.8 Million and Bans Them from
Trading for One Year, for Spoofing in Numerous Commodity Futures Contracts (July 22,
2013), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/6649-13 [https://perma.cc/6MPS-A8S7]
[hereinafter CFTC Press Release on Coscia]; Michael M. Philipp & Dina R. Kaufman, Prosecutors
Record First-Ever Conviction for ‘Spoofing’: A New Era of Trading Enforcement, MORGAN LEWIS:
LAWFLASH (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2015/11/prosecutors-record-firstever-conviction-for-spoofing [https://perma.cc/9GWM-E48H].
148. Philipp & Kaufman, supra note 147 (detailing Coscia’s spoofing method).
149. Id. (“The CFTC Order requires Panther and Coscia to . . . disgorge $1.4 million in trading
profits . . . .”).
150. See Davis, supra note 142 (“The technique, known as spoofing, allegedly allowed Sarao to
profit from artificial price movements.”).
151. Id. (“The criminal complaint says that Sarao’s offers to sell Standard & Poor’s 500 EMinis, a commonly traded stock index future, eventually totaled 29 percent of the market.”);
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE
MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 2, 5 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/
marketevents-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEV5-3F68]:
However, on May 6, when markets were already under stress, the Sell Algorithm chosen
by the large trader to only target trading volume, and neither price nor time, executed
the sell program extremely rapidly in just 20 minutes. . . . Between 2:40 p.m. and 3:00
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window of time, prices of various financial products plummeted to
pennies, while other prices increased to incredulous highs. 152 Owing to
the volatility, traders exited the market, thereby reducing liquidity and
exacerbating the crisis.153 When the dust settled, the market had
suffered approximately one trillion dollars in losses. 154
In both examples, the traders programmed their trading
algorithms to deliberately distort the markets. The trading algorithms
were instructed to flood the markets, which created artificial prices and
allowed each defendant to profit.155 Although it took authorities months
to piece together what occurred in the market each time, the trading
algorithms left a paper trail that allowed regulators to decipher what
happened and how.156 The design of these rules-based algorithms also
demonstrated the true, underlying intent of the traders. Notably, both
Coscia and Sarao defended their actions by claiming that the
algorithms’ actions did not reflect their intentions as the programmer.
Once regulators gained access to the trading algorithms, however, the
traders’ manipulative intent was evident from the programming
language.157 In similarly “easy” cases involving the deliberate misuse of
algorithms for manipulation, regulators should be able to meet the
p.m., approximately 2 billion shares traded with a total volume exceeding $56 billion.
Over 98% of all shares were executed at prices within 10% of their 2:40 p.m. value.
However, as liquidity completely evaporated in a number of individual securities and
ETFs, participants instructed to sell (or buy) at the market found no immediately
available buy interest (or sell interest) resulting in trades being executed at irrational
prices as low as one penny . . . .
152. Johnson, supra note 130, at 835 (explaining the Flash Crash in 2010 and detailing some
of the price fluctuations that occurred during the crash).
153. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 151, at 1,
35–37 (discussing the exodus of traders due to volatility and ensuing reduction in liquidity); see
also Matt Phillips, Nasdaq: Here’s Our Timeline of the Flash Crash, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2010,
12:34 PM ET), https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/05/11/nasdaq-heres-our-timeline-of-theflash-crash [https://perma.cc/52YA-XGCG] (reporting on and analyzing the statements of
executives from NASDAQ and NYSE outlining the timeline of the flash crashes during a related
congressional hearing).
154. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 151;
Phillips, supra note 153; see also Edgar Ortega Barrales, Lessons from the Flash Crash for the
Regulation of High-Frequency Traders, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1195, 1196 (2012) (“In
twenty minutes on May 6, 2010, stock market investors lost about $862 billion.”).
155. CFTC Press Release on Coscia, supra note 147; Davis, supra note 142.
156. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 151; Davis,
supra note 142.
157. See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Futures Trader Charged with Illegally Manipulating
Stock Market, Contributing to the May 2010 Market ‘Flash Crash’ (Apr. 21, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/futures-trader-charged-illegally-manipulating-stock-marketcontributing-may-2010-market-flash [https://perma.cc/PU4B-L8T2] (explaining that Sarao’s
algorithm used a “ ‘dynamic layering’ scheme . . . [to] create[ ] the appearance of substantial supply
in the market”); CFTC Press Release on Coscia, supra note 147 (“While forms of algorithmic
trading are of course lawful, using a computer program that is written to spoof the market is illegal
and will not be tolerated.”).
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evidentiary burden of scienter through the paper trail left in the rules
of the algorithm’s source code. To the extent there are obvious or
plausible signs of manipulative intent, it ought to be straightforward
enough to hold defendants liable for violating Rule 10b-5, Rule 180.1,
or the spoofing provision.
Yet, Coscia and Sarao’s claims that the algorithms’ actions did
not reflect their intentions as the programmer are noteworthy. Their
claims demonstrate that perpetrators of algorithmic manipulation are
likely to point to the innate layer of abstraction between themselves and
the algorithm as a defense. Simply put, traders accused of algorithmic
manipulation will likely raise as a defense differences between what
they intended the algorithm to do and what the algorithm actually did.
Such defenses are not likely to hold in deliberate manipulation cases,
especially those involving rules-based algorithms that can be reverse
engineered. With access to a trading program’s design and rules,
regulators should be able to ferret out the true intent of traders. It
remains to be seen, however, whether regulators have the time and
resources to effectively assign liability for such manipulative conduct.
2. The Medium Case: Open-Market Manipulation &
Unintended but Harmful Distortion
A stronger challenge to the anti-manipulation framework arises
when the intent of the programmer may not be evident from the
programming code. While this may be possible in numerous instances,
two are highlighted here.
First, the manipulative intent of the programmer may not be
evident if the algorithm is designed to use facially legitimate
transactions to distort the markets (that is, to engage in open-market
manipulation).158 A trader could program her trading algorithm to short
sell stocks aggressively or to engage in heavy trading at the end of the
day, a strategy known as marking the close.159 Either strategy can cause
a significant impact on the price of the stock because of the timing and
volume of the transactions. Neither practice, however, is per se illegal.
As previously discussed, to determine whether such practices are
manipulative, courts have traditionally looked to the intent of the

158. Fletcher, supra note 8 (defining open-market manipulation).
159. See id. at 506–07 (identifying the practice of short selling as a common manipulative
trading strategy, especially when it is “aggressive,” and the practice of marking the close); In re
Kocherhans, Exchange Act Release No. 36556, 60 SEC Docket 2210, 2212 (Dec. 6, 1995) (defining
“marking the close” as a manipulative practice that is employed in an attempt to “influence the
closing price of a stock by executing purchase or sale orders at or near the close of the market”).
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trader.160 But with trading algorithms, even those that operate on
preprogrammed instructions, making such determinations regarding
manipulative intent can be quite difficult. In this instance, despite the
paper trail the algorithm leaves behind, it may not be enough to
decipher a clear intent to manipulate to meet the scienter requirement
for open-market manipulation.
Second, the algorithm may operate in a way that is unexpected
and truly does not reflect the intent of the programmer. Here, the
algorithm’s unexpected behavior does not arise from the algorithm’s
“intuitive” neural response to data. Rather, the unexpected distortion
is the result of a failure to properly design and test the algorithm before
installation, a failure to properly monitor and respond to warning signs
of potential, or a mistake in the algorithm’s code. If one defines
manipulation based on the intent of the actor, as many scholars and
jurists do,161 such conduct may not rise to the level of illegal
manipulation. Instead, this conduct may be classified as negligent or
reckless. Even if one does not deem the unintended consequences to be
illegal manipulation, such algorithms can nonetheless wreak havoc and
have dire consequences for the market. Under the current antimanipulation framework, it is highly doubtful that liability would
attach for such unintended distortion, unless the Commissions are able
to prove that the defendant’s conduct rose to the level of recklessness
necessary to violate Rule 10b-5 or Rule 180.1.162
3. The Hard Case: Rational Distortion & Independent Misconduct
The most significant challenge to the anti-manipulation
framework stems from AI machine-learning algorithms that may
distort the markets as part of their dynamic learning and
160. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
161. Manipulative purpose is a required element to prove manipulative practice under section
9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2). Courts and scholars repeatedly analyze
manipulative purpose by utilizing circumstantial evidence to extrapolate intent. See, e.g., United
States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 331–32 (2d Cir. 1964) (describing the criteria that should inform
analysis of circumstantial evidence to discern intent); In re The Federal Corp., Exchange Act
Release No. 3909, 25 S.E.C. 227, 230 (Jan. 19, 1947) (“Since it is impossible to probe into the depths
of [an actor]’s mind [to prove manipulative purpose], it is [usually] necessary . . . that the finding
of manipulative purpose be based on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.”); Fischel &
Ross, supra note 23, at 510 (“The only definition [of manipulation] that makes any sense is
subjective—it focuses entirely on the intent of the [actor].”); see also supra Section II.A (discussing
the scienter element of the Acts).
162. This analysis is limited to liability under the anti-manipulation framework specifically
and does not address potential liability under FINRA or NFA rules or other Commission
regulations that may capture this form of misconduct. See, e.g., Yadav, supra note 122, at 1039,
1057–58 (discussing how the negligence standard and the market access rule addressed similar
unintended distortions in the securities markets).
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decisionmaking process. To the extent algorithmic trading programs
are capable of learning and making independent (that is, not merely
rules-based) decisions to meet set goals, then there is possibility that
an algorithm may manipulate the market in unforeseen and even
unforeseeable ways. Although there is a wealth of potential
hypothetical scenarios in which trading algorithms could unexpectedly
manipulate the markets, this Article explores the possibility of (1)
“rational distortion” and (2) “independent misconduct,” particularly by
an AI-based trading algorithm.
First, an algorithm may be programmed to accomplish a
legitimate goal but may engage in rationally disruptive or distortive
conduct to achieve that goal. For example, the algorithm may place and
cancel a large number of orders repeatedly to gain valuable information
it then uses to accomplish its programmed goals. 163 The underlying
conduct—placing and cancelling orders repeatedly—is not per se illegal
and, without more, does not rise to the level of illegal manipulation. Yet,
such conduct is disruptive to the markets—it can distort the asset’s
price, which now incorporates noise trading rather than reflecting the
asset’s inherent value,164 and it can create a false appearance of
liquidity in the market. Traditionally, liability for such conduct
required a showing that the defendant acted with scienter, but, as
discussed above, this may be difficult to prove, especially with AI
machine-learning algorithms.
Further, if the algorithm has adopted AI machine-learning
techniques, it could have rationally decided to engage in this conduct as
the most efficient means to accomplish its trading goals. Importantly,
the programmer may not have expected the algorithm to engage in
rational distortion, and she may not be able to explain why the AI
machine-learning algorithm decided that distortion was appropriate.
To the extent the algorithm’s distortion creates an artificial price,
liability under the CEA would require evidence that the programmer
had the specific intent to manipulate the commodity165—a difficult task
even when there is no AI machine-learning trading algorithm involved.
Holding the programmer liable under the lower scienter requirements
163. This example draws on the trading strategy known as “pinging” whereby algorithms
place and cancel orders repeatedly to determine the lowest or highest price a trader is willing
to pay for an asset. See FINRA Staff, Getting Up to Speed on High-Frequency Trading, FINRA
(Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.finra.org/investors/insights/getting-speed-high-frequency-trading
[https://perma.cc/4ERT-7R2F].
164. Yadav, supra note 122, at 1075 (“More problematically, the market suffers if prices reflect
noise created by such evasions or a degree of discounting on the part of traders internalizing higher
transaction costs.”).
165. See Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 9(1)–(3); see also supra notes 97–98 and
accompanying text.
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of Rules 10b-5 and 180.1 may still prove difficult if the programmer and
the regulators are unable to reverse engineer the algorithm’s
decisionmaking to see why it engaged in distortion.
Second, an AI machine-learning algorithmic program may
“discover” the profitability of manipulative conduct and decide to
engage in such conduct independent of its intended design. For
example, an AI trading algorithm may independently “learn” that if it
engages in certain types of trading strategies it can earn greater profits.
The algorithm’s programmers never intended for these trading
strategies to be executed, and, to take it one step further, the
programmer specifically instructed the AI algorithm to not engage in
illegal manipulation. Yet, the AI algorithm may nonetheless discover
strategies currently unknown to human traders that manipulate prices
and increase the algorithm’s profitability.
Alternately, suppose “two or more [AI algorithms]
independently discover that they can profit from cooperating in a
pattern of trading activity.”166 Additionally, the AI algorithms have
learned how to better cloak their conduct from surveillance by working
together, thereby strengthening their ability to manipulate the
markets. Again, as with the previous hypothetical, this misconduct is
independent of the intended goals of the algorithm.
Although at first blush this seems like a far-fetched
hypothetical, it is not. In 2017, it was reported that AI algorithms on
Facebook that were tasked with bartering created their own language
for the bartering exercise.167 In light of AI algorithms’ ability to discover
ways to cooperate and communicate, it is not unbelievable that they
may discover ways to engage in manipulation. Because AI machinelearning decisions cannot be reverse engineered, regulators are in the
dark as to whether the programmer intended the AI algorithm’s
manipulative behavior. And, even if the programmer did intend such
behavior, she may be able to shield herself from liability through the
complexity of the algorithm. The essentiality of scienter to assigning
liability becomes more problematic when dealing with AI machinelearning algorithms, whose conduct remains a black box ex post. It is
questionable, therefore, whether the scienter-focused anti-

166. Collin Starkweather & Izzy Nelken, Artificial Intent: AI on the Trading Floor, LAW360
(Jan. 23, 2019, 1:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1119871/artificial-intent-ai-on-thetrading-floor [https://perma.cc/SEW7-SCBK].
167. Andrew Griffin, Facebook’s Artificial Intelligence Robots Shut Down After They Start
Talking to Each Other in Their Own Language, INDEPENDENT (July 31, 2017, 5:10 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-artificial-intelligenceai-chatbot-new-language-research-openai-google-a7869706.html [https://perma.cc/PR3M-238A].
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III. THE FAILURE TO DETER ALGORITHMIC MANIPULATION
The rise of algorithmic trading strains one of the fundamental
goals of the anti-manipulation framework—deterrence. To the extent
the legal framework does not clearly identify what constitutes
impermissible conduct and fails to effectively punish those who violate
the law, it is ineffective in achieving deterrence. Liability for the most
common market manipulation offenses requires a showing that, at a
minimum, the defendant acted recklessly.168 Historically, the legal
regime has posed problems for regulators in punishing manipulation in
human-dominated markets; these issues are further amplified with
algorithmic trading. The scienter-focused liability framework creates a
vague, overbroad standard with limited application to algorithms and
algorithmic manipulation.169 Further, with the involvement of
algorithms, both preprogrammed and AI machine-learning types,
identifying scienter to hold a human responsible for the manipulative
conduct of an algorithm is a difficult feat. In sum, the outsized role of
intent in the regulatory framework restricts the ability of regulators to
hold traders liable for algorithmic manipulation. This renders
punishment uncertain, even in the face of significant market harm, and
weakens the deterrent effect of the anti-manipulation legal regime.
One important point to note here: algorithms qua algorithms
cannot be deterred. Regardless of the capacity of algorithms to learn,
assess, and adjust their decisions, algorithms cannot appreciate the
legal liability for their decisions, and holding an algorithm liable for its
misdeeds is futile.170 Therefore, the focus of deterrence has to be on
whether and to what extent we can deter humans from misusing
algorithms to manipulate the markets or, alternately, how
to incentivize programmers to take greater care in designing
their algorithms.
At present, the legal regime does not credibly deter algorithmrelated market manipulation because there is significant uncertainty of
punishment. Part II analyzed the gaps created by the scienter-focused
legal regime, which directly diminish deterrence of algorithm-based
168. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
169. See Scopino, supra note 107, at 252 (explaining the gap between crimes requiring scienter
and AI).
170. At a minimum, it seems futile at this juncture. Future developments in AI may result in
conscious robots and algorithms that can appreciate the consequences of their actions, but it is
safe to say that we are not there yet.
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manipulation. This Part aims to demonstrate that by grounding
liability in scienter, the legal framework fails to adequately punish
many forms of algorithm-related manipulation and other forms may
evade punishment altogether. Thus, current laws and regulations fail
to effectively deter manipulation in the markets, undermining
regulators’ authority and efficient capital allocation.
A. Algorithms & Scienter
One of the primary obstacles to application of anti-manipulation
laws to algorithms is the basic principle that algorithms cannot form
intent. Only humans and business entities constitute “persons” under
the law;171 thus, unsurprisingly, computers, algorithms, and AI
programs do not have legal personhood.172 When algorithms cause
market disruptions or distortions, it is necessary to identify which legal
person ought to be held responsible. But this inquiry is not as
straightforward as it initially appears. With preprogrammed
algorithms, trading is a matter of following preset electronic
instructions—if X occurs, then do Y. Market harm that results from
these types of algorithms can often be traced back to human
programmers; even if the process is time consuming and costly, it is,
nonetheless, possible.173 Presuming intent is visible through the code,
the programmer is liable for the manipulative conduct of the algorithm,
even if it goes beyond the scope of her initial plans. The manipulative
intent of the programmer, therefore, allows us to hold her accountable
for any resulting algorithmic misconduct.
But the issue is murkier when dealing with AI algorithms
employing machine-learning techniques. As discussed above, AI
machine-learning algorithms learn and modify their behavior in
response to continuous analysis of the markets, available information,
and expected market movements, without human guidance.174 In these
171. See Amanda D. Johnson, Comment, Originalism and Citizens United: The Struggle of
Corporate Personhood, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 187, 187 (2010) (indicating that Citizens United stands
for the proposition that business entities and individuals have equal identity as “persons” under
the law).
172. Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of
Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 95 (2015) (“(1) [N]onhuman forms of life,
including other animals; (2) natural systems; and (3) algorithmic processes implemented in
software or hardware, including those that underlie modern computer systems—are not
traditionally conceived as legal persons.”).
173. See Davis, supra note 142 (explaining that to catch Sarao, regulators had to “pick through
mountains of trading data” and seek “the assistance of a consulting firm and a highpriced professor”).
174. See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 399, 405 (2017) (describing machine learning); Machine Learning Algorithms for Trading,
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instances, the most direct “decisionmaker,” whose intent ought to
matter for assigning liability, is the algorithm. Given that algorithms
cannot legally form the requisite intent, even when their actions are
independent, imposing liability on the algorithms for the consequences
of their harmful conduct is beyond the scope of the legal framework.175
Further, unless it can be demonstrated that the programmer had
manipulative intent when she designed the AI algorithm, it is unlikely
that the Commissions could hold her liable for the algorithm’s conduct.
In sum, given the difficulties in deciphering why an AI algorithm
utilizing machine learning makes the decisions it does, finding clear
evidence of intent is highly unlikely.
It is arguable, therefore, that algorithm-based manipulation is
less likely to result in legal liability because the law does not capture
algorithmic decisionmaking. The available loophole for algorithmic
manipulation would encourage potential wrongdoers to use algorithms
(the more complex the better) to manipulate the market, expecting that
the algorithm would mask their intentions. In the end, the low
likelihood of punishment for manipulation effectuated through
algorithms would decrease the deterrent effect of the legal regime, as
deterrence theory predicts.
B. The Problem of Abstraction
Given the limitations of directly applying anti-manipulation
liability to algorithms, deterrence of algorithmic manipulation lies in
altering the cost-benefit analysis of humans responsible for trading
algorithms. But there is an inherent layer of abstraction between the
programmer’s conduct and the algorithm’s operation that complicates
questions of scienter and, by extension, liability for manipulation. In
designing a preprogrammed algorithm, the programmer manifests her
goals for the algorithm through the programming code; 176 with AI
machine-learning algorithms, the programmer sets a goal for the
algorithm to achieve in solving a problem.177 Translating expectations
from natural language into computer code for an algorithm can be quite
TRADING TUITIONS (Feb. 9, 2017), http://tradingtuitions.com/machine-learning-algorithms-trading
[https://perma.cc/M9ND-NH7S] (“Machine learning algorithms for trading continuously monitor
the price charts, patterns, or any fundamental factors and adjust the rules accordingly.”).
175. See supra Section II.C for discussion on holding the programmer liable in
attenuated cases.
176. Yadav, supra note 83, at 1620 (explaining that after traders decide on a trading strategy,
“[p]rogrammers then build the computerized algorithm or series of algorithms to execute the
strategy in the market”).
177. Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311,
1324 (2019).
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challenging178 and, importantly, attenuates the causal connection
between the programmer’s intention and the algorithm’s ultimate
actions. This “layer of abstraction” between what the programmer
expects and what the algorithm does is possible with all
trading algorithms and is particularly acute with AI machinelearning algorithms.
Recall that the processes by which machine-learning AI
algorithms make decisions, namely neural networks, are a black box to
the programmer and to anyone investigating ex post. 179 Abstraction
coupled with the black box problem undercuts the likelihood of liability
because it is difficult to identify the programmer’s intent in most cases,
except for instances of deliberate manipulation. The further removed
the programmer is from the algorithm’s ultimate decisionmaking, the
less likely it is that regulators can successfully hold the programmer
responsible for market manipulation. Altogether, this creates legal
uncertainty because it is unclear at what point the programmer’s intent
is too remote to reasonably constitute the basis for liability; this
uncertainty encourages, rather than deters, algorithmic manipulation.
The layers of abstraction innate to preprogrammed and AI machinelearning algorithms, albeit to different degrees, diminish the relevance
and applicability of scienter as a basis of liability for manipulation.
Another way in which abstraction challenges the antimanipulation framework occurs when the link between the
programmer’s goals and the algorithm’s conduct is severed. This may
manifest in two ways. First, as discussed above, a programmer may
code a trading algorithm to accomplish a permissible trading strategy,
but the algorithm may engage in “rational distortion” to more efficiently
accomplish its goals.180 Although the trader did not intend for the
algorithm to distort the market, the AI algorithm’s machine-learning
techniques may have found a way to accomplish its goals using
impermissible means.
In such a case, some may argue that the algorithm’s ability to
engage in rational distortion is indicative of the programmer’s
underlying manipulative intent.181 Imputing liability to the
178. See David Auerbach, The Programs That Become the Programmers, SLATE (Sept. 25,
2015, 1:34 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2015/09/pedro-domingos-master-algorithm-howmachine-learning-is-reshaping-how-we-live.html [https://perma.cc/WS36-LT4E] (explaining how
algorithms struggle in situations that do not have clear boundaries or defined terms).
179. See Bathaee, supra note 137, at 901–02 (explaining why humans are unable to process
the decisions made by neural networks).
180. See supra Section II.C.3.
181. See, e.g., Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability
in Hindsight, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 91, 101 (1995) (examining the problematic phenomenon
that a person is more likely to find blame when she has the benefit of ex post review).
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programmer on the basis of the ultimate conduct of the algorithm
would, however, be contrary to the anti-manipulation framework,
which grounds liability on ex ante intentions, not ex post harms. 182
Indeed, under the intent-based liability framework, the absence of the
programmer’s intent to manipulate the market ought to be sufficient to
protect her from liability. Scienter, therefore, does not provide a
satisfying basis on which to hold a programmer liable for the harm
resulting from the manipulative conduct of her algorithm when the link
between the two is severed.
Second, and notably, the law may provide a basis for liability in
the reverse scenario—that is, a situation in which the programmer
intended to manipulate the market, but the algorithm failed to do so.
In accordance with the Commissions’ intent-centric approach to “openmarket manipulation,” a trader can be liable for market manipulation
on the basis of her manipulative intent alone.183 Open-market
manipulation refers to market manipulation that is accomplished
entirely through facially legitimate transactions. 184 In prosecuting
traders for open-market manipulation, the Commissions have adopted
the theory of liability that manipulative intent alone is sufficient to hold
a trader liable for market manipulation.185 The example of intendedbut-failed algorithmic manipulation differs somewhat from openmarket manipulation in that no manipulation occurred; yet, the
Commissions’ theory of liability would impose liability on the
programmer based on her manipulative intent.186 This example,
particularly in contrast to the prior examples, demonstrates the
scienter standard’s overbroad nature when applied to algorithms,
which increases uncertainty and decreases deterrence.

182. See supra Section II.A.
183. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 23, at 510 (“[T]here is no objective definition of
manipulation. The only definition that makes any sense is subjective—it focuses entirely on the
intent of the trader.”).
184. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 484.
185. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 23, at 510.
186. See, e.g., Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Legality would thus
depend entirely on whether the investor’s intent was ‘an investment purpose’ or ‘solely to affect
the price of [the] security.’ ” (quoting United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1991))).
In holding that the CFTC’s complaint in CFTC v. Kraft Foods Group., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 996,
1014 (N.D. Ill. 2015), sufficiently pled manipulation, the court relied on the Commission’s
finding that:
(1) Kraft took a huge wheat futures position; (2) that it did not intend to use in
production; (3) but instead intended that the position would signal Kraft’s demand for
wheat in the relevant time period; (4) in a way that would mislead others in the market
into thinking that Kraft would take delivery of its futures position and not buy cash
wheat; (5) which was intended to, and in fact did, cause cash wheat prices to decrease
and the price for futures to increase.
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In sum, the anti-manipulation framework does not effectively
deter algorithmic manipulation because the level of abstraction
between the programmer and the algorithm undermines the
applicability of intent to the relevant conduct. The real and potential
gap between the aims of the programmer and the operation of the
trading algorithm attenuates liability for algorithmic manipulation,
especially in an intent-based framework, thereby rendering the liability
regime’s deterrence ineffective.
C. Uncertain Enforcement
Detecting algorithmic market manipulation is, on the one hand,
easier than detecting non-computer-based forms of manipulation. But
it can also be more difficult, particularly in algorithm-dominated
markets.
Algorithmic trading leaves behind evidence of executed
transactions that regulators can follow to identify manipulative and
disruptive conduct.187 Computerized trades provide a tangible record of
who did what and when that regulators can utilize to detect
wrongdoers. Once such misconduct is identified, regulators can seek
access to a trader’s programming code, which may indicate the
programmer’s manipulative intent and result in liability.188 In this
regard, algorithmic manipulation may be more easily detected than
traditional (i.e., non-computer-based) forms of market manipulation
that depended on undisclosed and, oftentimes, untraceable agreements
among parties.189
Yet, the availability of swaths of trading data, although a
blessing for regulators, can also be a burden to proving algorithmic
manipulation.190 To identify manipulative algorithms, regulators must
187. See Yadav note 83, at 1620 (“[A]utomated trading requires investment in constructing a
detailed plan before any trading can take place. Traders devise a strategy to buy and
sell securities.”).
188. See id. (“[T]raders set parameters within which their algorithms trade. . . . [A]lgorithms
comprise pre-set mathematical instructions that detail their exact terms of operation.”).
189. Yadav, supra note 122, at 1074 (“From an enforcer’s standpoint, this state of affairs is a
far cry from the back-room dealings and the nudges and winks that might have characterized
attempts at manipulation in nonautomated markets.”).
190. Koosha Golmohammadi, Osmar R. Zaïane & David Díaz, Detecting Stock Market
Manipulation Using Supervised Learning Algorithms, 2014 IEEE I NT’L CONF. ON DATA SCI. &
ADVANCED ANALYTICS 435, 435, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282950245_Detecting_
stock_market_manipulation_using_supervised_learning_algorithms
[https://perma.cc/C2879DRD]:
The existing approach in industry for detecting market manipulation is a top-down
approach that is based on a set of known patterns and predefined thresholds. . . . These
methods are based on expert knowledge but suffer from . . . issues[,] [including]
adapting to the changing market conditions whilst the amount of transactional data is
exponentially increasing . . . .
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sift through and interpret mountains of data to deduce problematic
trading patterns within a sea of legitimate ones. Even with deliberately
manipulative algorithms, this endeavor would require a significant
outlay of time, costs, and resources from regulators. Algorithmic
trading may leave a paper trail, but the effort required to interpret the
data and detect manipulative conduct could be a significant barrier in
detection, further weakening deterrence.191 Regulators would need the
expertise to decipher algorithmic code and trading programs to
determine whether the algorithm evidences the trader’s intent to
manipulate. The Commissions, however, lack the technology needed to
effectively oversee the markets, thereby leaving the markets
unprotected against the harms of algorithmic manipulation (a reality
acknowledged by regulators themselves).192 Thus, to the extent
regulators cannot successfully punish manipulation because of a lack of
resources or expertise, deterrence is less credible.
Importantly, regulatory oversight of algorithmic traders is
uneven, with half the market subject to regulatory oversight and the
other half not, which places the market in a precarious condition. On
the one hand, the SEC has some oversight of algorithmic traders.
Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (“Reg SCI”) requires
firms that employ algorithmic trading strategies to implement practices
to reduce the likelihood of harms from algorithmic trading programs
and mitigate their impact should they occur.193 These practices include
rules on general risk assessment and response, software development
and implementation, software testing, and compliance, among
others.194 Additionally, persons responsible for design, development, or
modification of an algorithmic trading program must be registered as a
“Securities Trader” with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
and pass a qualifying exam.195 Reg SCI was proposed in response to

191. See id. (describing the challenges of analyzing vast amounts of data to detect
market manipulation).
192. See Silla Brush, High-Speed Trades Outpace CFTC’s Oversight, O’Malia Says,
BLOOMBERG (May 6, 2014, 11:01 PM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0506/high-speed-trades-outpace-cftc-s-oversight-o-malia-says [https://perma.cc/7BFU-K5U9] (“The
CFTC lacks the technology necessary to routinely oversee the millions of messages traders send
every day to futures exchanges . . . .”).
193. See Spotlight on Regulation SCI, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regulation-sci.shtml
(last visited Oct. 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/LB64-3V8H] (broadly describing Reg
SCI’s requirements).
194. See Yesha Yadav, Algorithmic Trading and Market Regulation, in GLOBAL ALGORITHMIC
CAPITAL MARKETS: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING, DARK POOLS, AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES 232,
232–33, 241 (Walter Mattli ed., 2019).
195. Michael T. Foley, Janet M. Angstadt, Ross Pazzol & James D. Van De Graaff, FINRA
Rule Amendment Requires Registration of Associated Persons Who Develop Algorithmic Trading
Strategies, 17 J. INV. COMPLIANCE 39, 39 (2016).
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numerous high-profile technological failures, not least of which was the
Flash Crash.196 The regulations aim to strengthen the securities
markets, reduce errors, improve market resiliency in the face of errors,
and enhance the SEC’s oversight of the market’s technological
infrastructure.197 As an initial, albeit imperfect, step towards
algorithmic trading oversight, Reg SCI is useful in providing the SEC
with data about how algorithmic traders operate in the markets and
what impact algorithmic trading strategies’ have on the market.
On the other hand, the CFTC has no specific regulatory
oversight of algorithmic trading in the commodities markets. In 2015,
the CFTC proposed Regulation Automated Trading (“Reg AT”) to
address the agency’s concerns with the risks that arise from algorithmic
trading strategies, including market illiquidity and disruption.198
Under Reg AT, persons who trade using algorithmic programs would be
required to register with the CFTC and, consequently, be subject to
additional compliance requirements under Reg AT. 199 Also, Reg AT set
forth a multipart risk control structure that would enable the CFTC to
more closely monitor algorithmic trading at different stages in the
trading process.200 Lastly, and most controversially, Reg AT would
require the source code of algorithmic trading programs be preserved
according to specified provisions and accessible to the CFTC via
subpoena.201 Notably, the proposed regulations also would have granted
the CFTC access to records tracking any changes to the source code and
to log files recording the algorithm’s market activity.202 Reg AT received
considerable pushback from the industry, especially with regards to

196. Samuel Wolff & Amy Thayer, Cybersecurity and the SEC: Part 2, 38 SEC. & FED. CORP.
L. REP., no. 1, 2016, at 1, 3.
197. Regulations Systems Compliance and Integrity, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,084, 18,092 (proposed
Mar. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242, 249).
198. Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,824 (proposed Dec. 17, 2015) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 38, 40, 170). The Proposed Rule was opened for a second round of
commenting in January 2017, but ultimately was not promulgated. Regulation Automated
Trading, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,502 (comment period extended Jan. 26, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 1, 38, 40, 170); Regulation Automated Trading; Withdrawal, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,755 (July 15, 2020)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 38, 40, 170).
199. Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. at 78,914.
200. Id. at 78,838.
201. Regulation Automated Trading, 81 Fed. Reg. 85,334, 85,337 (proposed Nov. 25, 2016) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 38, 40, 170). Reg AT and the Supplemental Proposal also require
periodic review of compliance with Reg AT and offer options to facilitate the compliance of thirdparty systems. Fact Sheet – Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulation
Automated
Trading,
COMMODITY
FUTURES
TRADING
COMM’N
2–3
(2016),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/regat_factshe
et110316.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U7F-DRTB ] [hereinafter CFTC Fact Sheet].
202. CFTC Fact Sheet, supra note 201, at 2.
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source code access and preservation.203 After reproposing the rules and
a change from the Obama to Trump Administration, Reg AT was
never finalized.204
The discrepancy between the level of regulatory oversight each
agency has over algorithmic trading in its respective markets creates a
significant gap in the anti-manipulation legal regime. With the SEC
having more meaningful oversight over algorithmic trading, it is in a
better position to identify manipulation and possibly minimize its
impact on the markets. The CFTC, on the other hand, has limited ex
ante market information, thereby diminishing the agency’s efficacy in
detecting potentially manipulative behavior.
The absence of algorithmic trading surveillance in the
commodities markets decreases the likelihood of would-be
manipulators being caught and punished, weakening the deterrent
effect of the anti-manipulation framework. Further, the lopsided
market oversight encourages regulatory arbitrage, as algorithmic
traders preferring less regulation are likely to gravitate to the
commodities market. Given the interconnected nature of the markets,
however, whatever risks that accumulate in the commodities markets
are likely to spill over into the securities markets. 205 Thus, the uneven
likelihood of detection diminishes deterrence in the markets overall,
as wrongdoers gravitate to markets in which their misdeeds are
likely undetected.
D. Dissimilar Liability
Uncertainty also arises when similar conduct receives dissimilar
treatment under the legal framework. To the extent would-be
manipulators receive different liability for conduct that is similar in
203. See Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. at 78,947 (“Regulation AT dramatically
lowers the bar for the federal government to obtain [a source code repository for algorithms].”); see
also Gregory Meyer & Phillip Stafford, US Regulators Propose Powers to Scrutinise Algo Traders’
Source Code, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/137f81bc-944f-11e5-b190291e94b77c8f [https://perma.cc/HV62-J4TZ] (explaining concerns of HF trading firms in response
to the new regulation).
204. Nicholas A.J. Wendland, CFTC Withdraws Regulation AT and Proposes New Electronic
Trading Risk Principles, NAT’L L. REV. (July 8, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cftcwithdraws-regulation-and-proposes-new-electronic-trading-risk-principles
[https://perma.cc/
H23J-MXVT]. As of February 2021, algorithmic trading remains unregulated in the commodities
market. The recently elected Biden Administration has not yet made any indication whether it
will attempt to revive the proposal.
205. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, app. A, at 15 (2010),
https://www.sec.gov/sec-cftc-prelimreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXL8-4DXY] (“Because the
markets today are increasingly fast, automated, and interconnected, an erroneous trade on one
market can very rapidly trigger a wave of similarly erroneous trades on other markets.”).
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function but not in form, the legal regime’s deterrent effect is weakened.
The problem of dissimilar treatment for similar conduct is not unique
to algorithmic versus human manipulation. Rather, it is a deeper
problem associated with the scienter focus of anti-manipulation laws
and regulations, especially as applied to open-market manipulation. As
discussed above, under the current theory of open-market
manipulation, a trader can be liable for manipulation even if her
transactions are legitimate if she had the intent to manipulate the
market at the time of trading.206 Practically, this means that two
traders may engage in the same conduct, but one may be liable for openmarket manipulation because of her intent and the other not liable
because she lacked the requisite intent. The Commissions’ approach
has been criticized for creating significant legal uncertainty regarding
how anti-manipulation laws are applied to legitimate transactions
because of the equivocal and circumstantial evidence typically relied on
to prove the trader’s manipulative intent.207 This issue is all the more
pronounced with algorithm-related manipulation.
Algorithms can more effectively implement legitimate trading
strategies that can distort or manipulate the market, but they will
always lack the requisite mental state to be held accountable. More to
the point, if a programmer uses an algorithm to engage in open-market
manipulation, the likelihood of liability is further decreased. The
legitimacy of the transactions would hinge liability on deciphering
whether the programmer had manipulative intent, and the evidentiary
burden is the same, if not heavier, with the involvement of a trading
algorithm. Again, without a smoking gun or convincing evidence of the
programmer’s manipulative intent, the use of an algorithm would likely
place the harm from open-market manipulation beyond the legal
framework’s scope.
Similarly, if an AI machine-learning algorithm independently
decides to engage in disruptive but not illegal conduct, such as marking

206. See supra note 109 and accompanying text; see, e.g., SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 2007):
[I]f an investor conducts an open-market transaction with the intent of artificially
affecting the price of the security, and not for any legitimate economic reason, it can
constitute market manipulation. Indeed, “the only definition [of market manipulation]
that makes any sense is subjective—it focuses entirely on the intent of the trader.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Fischel & Ross, supra note 23, at 510).
207. See Fletcher, supra note 8, at 553 (explaining that, under the Commissions’ approach,
“intent plays an outsized role that does not increase market safety”); see also John Crabb, CFTC’s
Market Manipulation Enforcement Position Under Fire, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (May 2, 2019),
https://www.iflr.com/article/b1lmx9r4l5vwbv/cftcs-market-manipulation-enforcement-positionunder-fire [https://perma.cc/SQG2-KHAT] (describing the CFTC’s “weakened” position in exerting
its anti-manipulation authority due to a recent loss at trial).
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the close,208 it is unclear whether the programmer would face liability.
And, for the reasons enumerated above, proving that the programmer
intended the algorithm’s behavior may be particularly difficult when
dealing with AI machine-learning algorithms.209 The current legal
regime makes it easier for algorithm-related open-market manipulation
to escape liability, despite being punishable when done by a human.
Imposing liability differently for similar conduct undermines the
deterrent effect of the regulatory regime, creating a loophole that
decreases the certainty of punishment for algorithmic manipulation.210
*

*

*

The existing liability framework fails to effectively deter
manipulation in financial markets increasingly dominated by
algorithmic trading. The mismatch between anti-manipulation laws
and the realities of algorithmic trading increases legal uncertainty,
making punishment, detection, and enforcement of algorithm-related
manipulation less likely. The law’s inability to fulfill one of its
fundamental goals leaves the markets vulnerable to increased
manipulative conduct and the attendant harms that accompany such
distortion. In sum, the law fails to force wrongdoers to internalize the
costs of their manipulative conduct, causing the markets to bear the
negative externalities of algorithm-related manipulation.
E. Market Implications of Failed Deterrence
The law’s shortcomings in achieving credible deterrence of
manipulative behavior are particularly salient as algorithmic trading
becomes the norm in the financial markets.211 The mismatch between
the requirements of the law and the realities of algorithmic trading
208. “Marking the close” (also known as “banging the close”) is the practice of aggressively
trading at the end of the trading day. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 507. The practice is not illegal, but
it is not looked on favorably by the Commissions; however, there are legitimate, nonmanipulative
reasons a trader may execute several transactions close to the end of the trading day. Id.;
see also CFTC Glossary, CFTC, https://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/
CFTCGlossary/glossary_b.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/EK4H-JLYV] (defining
“banging the close” as “[a] manipulative or disruptive trading practice”).
209. See supra Section III.A.
210. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, TRANSCRIPT OF TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE MEETING 158–59 (2014), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/
documents/file/tac_021014_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXL8-4DXY] (“[P]ractices that are
illegal when performed by humans, should be equally illegal when done by computers,” and if
current law does not account for this, “then there is an urgent need to adapt the rulebook to match
the playing field.”).
211. See Lin, supra note 24, at 1270–71 (highlighting the “new financial reality” for regulators
brought about by the increasing use of “advanced technology” in finance).
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facilitates greater opportunities for market manipulation, with
deleterious consequences for the financial markets’ health and stability.
Indeed, algorithmic-based manipulation has significant implications for
the markets that heighten the shortcomings of the existing legal regime
in effectively deterring this form of market abuse.
Specifically, failed deterrence of algorithm-related manipulation
exacerbates systemic risk in the markets.212 Typically, market
manipulation schemes are not considered to be a concern for financial
stability because of the limited scope and impact of manipulation
schemes. Manipulation schemes usually (1) target small, illiquid assets,
(2) one at a time, and (3) on a short-term horizon, which altogether
decreases the likelihood that such schemes would threaten market
stability.213 These limitations, however, are not applicable to algorithmrelated market manipulation because it may have deep and lasting
consequences on the financial markets. As seen with the 2010 Flash
Crash, algorithm-related manipulation can cause widespread volatility,
threatening the entire financial market’s stability.
First, algorithmic trading is used mostly in liquid assets because
the strategies employed depend on deep pools of liquidity to be
successful. Finding and profiting from arbitrage opportunities in the
markets in a fraction of a second, thousands of times per day, requires
access to highly liquid markets. The same is true of algorithm-related
market manipulation. Spoofing, for example, is most successful in
heavily traded assets because this allows the manipulator to profit from
her fake orders over thousands of trades. The focus of algorithm-related
manipulation on larger, more liquid assets increases the likelihood that
the fallout from such schemes will have systemic reverberations. This
was evident with the 2010 Flash Crash, in which Navinder Sarao
flooded the Chicago Mercantile Exchange with sell orders for the S&P
500 E-Minis.214 As a result of Sarao’s efforts to manipulate one of the
most commonly traded stock index futures, the financial market went

212. Steven L. Schwarcz provides an oft-quoted and useful definition of systemic risk:
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers
(through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions
or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in
the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial
financial-market price volatility.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
213. Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Macroeconomic Consequences of Market Manipulation, 83 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 125–27 (2020).
214. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Civil Monetary Penalties & Other Equitable Relief at 3,
CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 1:15-cv-03398, 2015 WL 1843321 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17,
2015), ECF No. 1.
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into a twenty-two-minute rollercoaster ride of volatility.215 And, in the
end, the market suffered a trillion dollars in losses. 216
Second, algorithms allow traders to buy and sell different asset
types at once, increasing the profitability of their trading strategies and
diversifying their investment risk. The same is also true of a
manipulator’s capacity. Rather than focusing her efforts on a single
asset, a would-be manipulator can focus on numerous assets, which
may exacerbate volatility and systemic harm in the markets. The DOJ
and CFTC’s criminal spoofing prosecution against Michael Coscia is a
salient example. In 2013, Coscia was charged with using one
algorithmic trading program across approximately twelve different
commodities markets to create an illusion of demand, thereby enabling
him to earn profits on smaller trades on the opposite side of the
market.217 According to prosecutors, with the aid of algorithmic trading
programs, Coscia netted $1.4 million in illegal profits in less than three
months.218 Although Coscia’s scheme did not destabilize the markets, it
is not far-fetched to think that it could have. Significant volatility in
numerous asset classes in a short span of time could have a similar
effect as seen in the 2010 Flash Crash, lending further support to
concerns that algorithm-related manipulation increases systemic risk
in the markets.
Third, notwithstanding the short-term horizon of manipulative
schemes, including algorithm-related ones, the interconnected nature
of the markets and the prevalence of algorithmic trading enhance the
risk that manipulation may cause financial instability. In algorithmdominated markets, the linkages between different market segments,
types of assets, and market actors may become fragile during times of
stress, such as extreme volatility owing to manipulation. Further, when
these networks are coupled with the high volume and high speed of
many algorithmic traders, there is a strong likelihood that a
manipulative scheme can destabilize the financial markets. In the
absence of manipulation, these market networks increase efficiency
within the markets. These connections, however, can also facilitate the
spread of contagion throughout the market. The prevalence of
algorithmic trading in the markets also contributes to the spread of

215. Id. at 3; COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 151,
at 1–3.
216. CFTC Fact Sheet, supra note 201; see also Barrales, supra note 154, at 1195–97 (noting
that, in addition to causing momentary losses of nearly $1 trillion, the Flash Crash “rattled
investor confidence” and precipitated withdrawals of $90 billion from U.S. stock mutual funds).
217. CFTC Press Release on Coscia, supra note 147 (detailing Coscia’s spoofing method).
218. Id. (“The CFTC Order requires Panther and Coscia to . . . disgorge $1.4 million in trading
profits . . . .”).
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instability across these networks. Many algorithms make similar
assumptions about the markets and tend to react similarly to market
movements, especially in times of stress. 219 The correlated responses of
algorithms and the networks that link the markets all contribute
to the likelihood that algorithm-related manipulation will cause
systemic harm.
Although the 2010 Flash Crash is one of the most significant
examples to date, there are numerous additional examples of other
flash crashes in the markets. For example, one day in 2015, the Dow
fell 1,100 points in the first five minutes of trading, owing to fears of a
slowing Chinese economy and market illiquidity.220 During this crash,
HF and other algorithmic traders withdrew en masse from the market,
further exacerbating illiquidity and pricing anomalies. 221 Similarly, in
2016 the British pound fell by six percent against the U.S. dollar, which
some believe was as a result of algorithms reacting to commentary on
Brexit.222 Despite the fact that neither example is specifically tied to
algorithmic manipulation, they demonstrate the ease with which
volatility and instability can spread through algorithm-dominated
markets, affecting a wide range of stocks, indices, and traders.223 One
can fairly assume that these effects would be worse if a manipulative
scheme or a rogue algorithm were behind the markets’ deterioration.
The interconnections between markets, the prevalence of high-volume
algorithmic traders, and the herding tendencies of algorithmic
programs increase the systemic risks arising from manipulative
219. See GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., supra note 131, at 61–87 (explaining that algorithmic trading
“can lead to significant instability in financial markets . . . [due to] self-reinforcing feedback
loops . . . [that] can amplify internal risks and lead to undesired interactions and outcomes”).
220. Bob Pisani, What Happened During the Aug 24 ‘Flash Crash,’ CNBC: TRADER TALK (Sept.
25, 2015, 3:59 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/25/what-happened-during-the-aug-24flash-crash.html [https://perma.cc/2YGA-DRRU].
221. Id.
222. Jethro Mullen, U.K. Pound Plunges More Than 6% in Mysterious Flash Crash, CNN
(Oct. 7, 2016, 11:30 AM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2016/10/06/investing/pound-flash-crashcurrency-brexit/index.html [https://perma.cc/7294-8UWE]; Jamie Condliffe, Algorithms Probably
Caused a Flash Crash of the British Pound, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 7, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/10/07/244656/algorithms-probably-caused-a-flash-crashof-the-british-pound [https://perma.cc/LYB2-RRD3].
223. See, e.g., Mullen, supra note 222; Pisani, supra note 220; Fred Imbert, ‘Flash Crash’ Hits
the Currency Markets as Financial Volatility Intensifies, CNBC (Jan. 3, 2019, 8:17 AM EST),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/03/yen-surges-against-global-currencies-after-flash-crash.html
[https://perma.cc/76E4-WXMV] (explaining the surge in value of the Japanese Yen as the result of
an eight percent flash crash in Apple stock stoking economic fears); Fitz Tepper, Coinbase Is
Reimbursing Losses Caused by the Ethereum Flash Crash, TECHCRUNCH (June 24, 2017, 11:32 AM
CDT), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/24/coinbase-is-reimbursing-losses-caused-by-the-ethereumflash-crash [https://perma.cc/WC5D-ZWVC] (attributing Ethereum’s flash crash from
approximately $320.00 to $0.10 to a large sell order triggering eight hundred stop loss orders and
margin liquidations).
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schemes, propagating their impact beyond their original sphere. The
legal framework’s failure to credibly deter algorithm-related
manipulation exposes the financial markets to a significant source of
systemic risk. Therefore, it becomes increasingly important to consider
how to create an effective system of deterrence in algorithm-dominated
financial markets.
IV. PATHWAYS FORWARD: ACHIEVING CREDIBLE DETERRENCE
As algorithms, especially AI algorithms, become more
ubiquitous in the financial markets, it is increasingly important to
address the gaps that arise from the application of the law to evolving
technologies. The challenge facing lawmakers is how to foster
technological innovation in the markets without allowing modern-day
manipulation techniques that exploit the technology to thrive. The antimanipulation framework’s failure to effectively detect, punish, and
ultimately deter algorithm-related manipulation has significant
repercussions for the markets, as discussed above.
This Part considers potential pathways forward in algorithmdominated markets to create a credible deterrence regime for
manipulation and, potentially, other financial regulation violations
tethered to scienter. This Part analyzes the promises and shortcomings
of an oft-proposed solution to the problems of algorithms and AI in
various domains: transparency. This Part also assesses a range of legal
and policy responses that can emphasize certainty of punishment,
thereby enhancing the legal regime’s deterrence of manipulation.
A. Transparent & Explainable Algorithms
With preset algorithms, review of the code and the programmer’s
work ought to provide insight into the operations and decisions of the
algorithm. With AI machine-learning algorithms, however, examining
the work of the programmer is not likely to make the algorithm’s
decisionmaking any clearer. A recurring proposed solution to the black
box problem that is innate to AI algorithms is to make them more
transparent and explainable.224 The inability to understand the
rationale behind an algorithm’s decisionmaking raises concerns
regarding the trustworthiness of the algorithm’s operations in the
markets, especially when it distorts or otherwise harms the markets.
Demands for greater explainability and transparency are particularly
224. See, e.g., Amina Adadi & Mohammed Berrada, Peeking Inside the Black-Box: A Survey on
Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), 6 IEEE ACCESS 52138, 52138 (2018),
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8466590 [https://perma.cc/8WXG-T2A5].
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strong in instances when individual liberty is at stake, such as in
criminal sentencing and determinations of recidivism risk. 225 But
concerns regarding the opacity of AI algorithms’ decisionmaking
permeate a range of fields—from health care, to consumer finance,
to hiring.226
In response to these concerns, there has been a growing push for
the development and deployment of “explainable AI.” Explainable AI
refers to the range of efforts to assist humans in understanding how or
why a machine-learning algorithm arrived at its decision or solution.227
The emphasis is on providing insight into how the algorithm operates
or an approximation of its processes in reaching its final conclusion. In
addition to machine-learning models that are designed to be
explainable and transparent, explainable AI has two broad approaches.
One approach is the “exogenous approach,” which aims to
explain how the entire model works or, alternately, how the model
works in a specific case.228 The exogenous approach provides
information on how the AI algorithm works by explaining the
programmer’s intentions, the parameters and data used to train the
algorithm, and the means by which the algorithm was tested to
prevent or minimize the occurrence of unwanted behavior, among
other things.229
The second approach to explainable AI attempts to replicate the
AI algorithm’s decisionmaking.230 Revealing the course code underlying
the algorithm is one way to accomplish this, but, as described above,
this may prove unsatisfactory because of the machine-learning
techniques used.231 Another alternative would be to create a “surrogate
225. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Population-Based Sentencing, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 353;
Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017) (explaining the need for
accountability measures for developers who create tools used to evaluate recidivism risk for
purposes of criminal sentencing).
226. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Medical Malpractice and Black-Box Medicine, in BIG
DATA, HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 295 (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Effy Vayena &
Urs Gasser eds., 2018) (assessing the black box problems that stem from the use of AI in medicine
and healthcare); Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale & Jennifer Chapman, Artificial Intelligence,
Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499
(2019) (discussing the problems of AI in consumer finance); McKenzie Raub, Bots, Bias and Big
Data: Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Bias and Disparate Impact Liability in Hiring Practices,
71 ARK. L. REV. 529 (2018) (addressing the systemic and legal problems posed by introducing AI
algorithms into hiring systems).
227. Ashley Deeks, The Judicial Demand for Explainable Artificial Intelligence, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 1829, 1834 (defining explainable AI).
228. Id. at 1835–37 (defining and describing the exogenous approach to explainable AI).
229. Id. at 1835.
230. Id. at 1837.
231. See supra Section II.B.2 (explaining the difficulty in fully understanding AI’s
decisionmaking process in producing outputs through machine learning).
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model,” which assesses the inputs and outputs the machine-learning
algorithm uses, thereby providing insight into how the algorithm may
weigh certain factors in its decisionmaking.232
Explainable AI undoubtedly has significant promise for
increasing the transparency of algorithms, both preset and AI machine
learning, that are utilized in the financial markets. The benefits of
making AI algorithms more explainable and transparent are many—
greater trust in algorithms’ operations, greater accountability for
harms resulting from algorithms’ defect or misconduct, and reduction
of intentional (or unintentional) use of algorithms to distort or
manipulate the markets, among others.233 If regulators only permitted
explainable algorithms to operate in the markets, this would likely
reduce the ability of wrongdoers to hide behind complexity and
transparency when an algorithm harmed the market through
manipulation or rational distortion. Yet, there are real costs that
accompany explainable AI—costs which reduce the expected benefits of
requiring greater transparency and explainability of algorithms.
First, algorithms that are built to be explained are less complex
than those that are black boxes. Notably, the reduced complexity that
increases the algorithm’s transparency and explainability also
decreases its reliability.234 The decreased accuracy of explainable AI is
concerning and would be a significant tradeoff in the quest to increase
the transparency of algorithmic decisionmaking. Indeed, an
explainable, yet less precise, AI algorithm is likely to increase volatility
and distortion in the market. While the algorithms’ outputs are more
interpretable, in this instance, the market is not better off with the use
of explainable AI versus black box machine-learning algorithms.
Further, the algorithm’s reduced reliability means that it also becomes
a new source of risk, thereby increasing the potential market harm that
may arise from algorithms. The pursuit of transparency and
explainability, therefore, cannot be at the expense of accuracy and
reliability of the algorithm’s decisionmaking.

232. Deeks, supra note 227, at 1837.
233. See Finale Doshi-Velez & Been Kim, Towards a Rigorous Science of Interpretable
Machine Learning 1–3 (Mar. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/
1702.08608.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALR4-DM7J] (“[I]f the system can explain its reasoning, we then
can verify whether that reasoning is sound with respect to . . . other desiderata—such as fairness,
privacy, reliability, robustness, causality, usability and trust . . . .”).
234. See Finale Doshi-Velez, Mason Kortz, Ryan Budish, Chris Bavitz, Sam Gershman, David
O’Brien, Kate Scott, Stuart Shieber, James Waldo, David Weinberger, Adrian Weller & Alexandra
Wood, Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Explanation 3 (Dec. 20, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1711.01134.pdf [https://perma.cc/45FM-DEJZ] (“[E]xplanation
would come at the price of system accuracy or other performance objectives.”).
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Second, explainable AI is costly to design and build. 235 It would
cost programmers more time and money to build an explainable AI
algorithm as opposed to one that is not transparent. Indeed, the
expenses associated with explainable AI may stifle innovation, as
algorithm developers may be disincentivized to develop algorithms that
may be more efficient but less transparent.236 Further, explainable AI
may compel programmers to reveal trade secrets to enhance the
transparency and explainability of the algorithm. This would only
further disincentivize investment in the development of better and
more efficient AI algorithms. In addition, there are regulatory costs
associated with effectively overseeing explainable AI. For example,
there would need to be some authority that determines whether the
algorithm is sufficiently explainable to be allowed to operate in the
markets. Thus, there would be costs to regulators to review,
understand, and approve the algorithms. But, given the chronic
shortfall of regulatory expertise and resources to keep pace with
technology, it is questionable whether regulators would truly be in the
position to undertake these costs.237
Third, in generating more information about the algorithm’s
decisionmaking, explainable AI may also create new risks. The more
data is produced about an algorithm—its inputs, outputs, and inner
workings—the more vulnerable the algorithm becomes to hacking or
misuse.238 For example, an AI algorithm developer attempting to make
her algorithm more transparent may reveal information about its
operations. Another programmer can use the same information to
replicate the algorithm but for more malicious ends, such as market
manipulation. Developing explainable AI algorithms, therefore, may
have the perverse effect of making it easier for potential manipulators
235. See Cynthia Rudin, Stop Explaining Black Box Machine Learning Models for High Stakes
Decisions and Use Interpretable Models Instead, 1 NATURE MACH. INTEL. 206, 210 (2019) (noting
that domain expertise is needed to construct explainable AI and “many organizations do not have
analysts who have the training or expertise to construct interpretable models at all”); see also Q.
Vera Liao, Daniel Gruen & Sarah Miller, Questioning the AI: Informing Design Practices for
Explainable AI User Experiences 7 (Feb. 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/
pdf/2001.02478.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQH5-95VX] (explaining that “inherent tension often exists
between explainability and other system and business goals,” including costs and resources
involved in working with “data scientists, developers and other stakeholders” to make
AI explainable).
236. Doshi-Velez et al., supra note 234, at 21 (“Requiring every AI system to explain every
decision could result in less efficient systems, forced design choices, and a bias towards explainable
but suboptimal outcomes.”).
237. See Mirjana Stankovic, Nikola Neftenov & Bratislav Stankovic, Can Regulators Keep Up
with Emerging Technologies?, MEDIUM (Mar. 10, 2020), https://medium.com/swlh/can-regulatorskeep-up-with-emerging-technologies-c53448bcbd64 [https://perma.cc/8Y9W-LK75].
238. Andrew Burt, The AI Transparency Paradox, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/12/the-ai-transparency-paradox [https://perma.cc/KG9Y-PGUL].
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to gain access to effective source code that, with adjustments, could be
used to distort and manipulate the markets.
Fourth and finally, recent studies have called into question the
reliability of explainable AI. Specifically, researchers have shown that
some of the most promising techniques for explaining and interpreting
the outputs of black box algorithms can themselves be manipulated.239
According to the study, explainable AI can be exploited to provide
innocuous ex post explanations for insidiously discriminatory
behavior.240 The ability to trick an explainable AI system into
generating explanations that fail to see the AI algorithm’s misconduct
significantly undermines the utility of explainable AI to deter
manipulation. Indeed, the possibility of misusing explainable AI in this
way would exacerbate the problem of algorithm-related manipulation.
To the extent the explanation provided for the distortion provides a
defense for the manipulator’s misconduct, it would be all the more
difficult to hold her accountable for the harms the algorithm causes.
Increasing transparency and explainability, therefore, is
laudable but not a panacea. Providing more data about how algorithms
work will increase trust and accountability in the markets.
Transparency, however, is accompanied by a set of risks that may
undercut the expected benefits of greater explainability. From a policy
standpoint, therefore, it is important to consider the ramifications of
increased transparency to the broader goals of market efficiency,
investor protection, and, ultimately, credibly deterring manipulation in
the markets. To the extent greater transparency is sought as a means
of reducing algorithm-related manipulation, it must be balanced
against competing policy concerns and coupled with other mechanisms
to emphasize certainty of punishment, thereby increasing deterrence.
B. Emphasizing Certainty
Certainty of punishment is key to deterring algorithm-related
manipulation. To emphasize certainty, the scope and substance of the
legal regime matters, including the detection, conviction, and
imposition of meaningful sanctions on wrongdoers. The existing antimanipulation framework fails to provide certainty of punishment
because the law’s requirements—which depend on scienter to
determine liability—do not reflect the practicalities of algorithmic
trading, in which scienter is often indeterminable. This Section
239. Dylan Slack, Sophie Hilgard, Emily Jia, Sameer Singh & Himabindu Lakkaraju, Fooling
LIME and SHAP: Adversarial Attack on Post Hoc Explanation Methods, AIES ‘20, at 180, 182–85
(Feb. 7–8, 2020), https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3375627.3375830 [https://perma.cc/9QK5-JQJK].
240. Id. at 181.
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considers a range of potential responses to increase certainty of
punishment for algorithm-related market manipulation.
1. Focus on Harm, Not Intent
The focus on scienter is outdated for the modern, algorithmdominated markets that now exist. And, importantly, this emphasis on
intent hampers effective application of the legal regime to algorithmrelated manipulation. To increase certainty of punishment for
algorithm-related manipulation, this Article proposes minimizing or
eliminating the focus on scienter and, instead, emphasizing the harm
of the algorithm on the markets. A harm-based approach to
manipulation would de-emphasize scienter, allowing regulators and
private plaintiffs to pursue instances of algorithmic manipulation
regardless of the provable mental state of the human connected to the
algorithm. A focus on harm, in short, would emphasize the certainty of
punishment for manipulative conduct and deny wrongdoers the defense
that the algorithm was not carrying out their intent.
In other scholarship, the Author has proposed a harm-based
approach to manipulation to supplement the intent-only liability
standard for open-market manipulation.241 Here in the context of
algorithmic manipulation, however, this Article proposes eliminating
intent from the equation altogether, focusing exclusively on the harm
of the transaction to determine liability because of the innate difficulty
of identifying scienter when algorithms are involved in trading. In
identifying “harm,” this Article proposes referring to the purposes
underlying the anti-manipulation framework to determine whether a
human ought to be liable for the misconduct of an algorithm. Thus,
algorithmic conduct that decreases market efficiency or undercuts
investor protection goals may be the basis for liability for manipulation,
regardless of the programmer’s provable intent.
By focusing on harm, this Article aims to treat transactions that
have the same market impact similarly, rather than making
distinctions on the vague and hard-to-prove basis of mental state.
Consider: If an algorithm’s trades create an artificial stock price, its
conduct is no less impactful because the algorithm (or its programmer)
lacked manipulative intent. Rather, the price’s artificiality harms the
pricing efficiency of the markets and impairs investor trust and
confidence in the market. A harm-based approach, therefore,
emphasizes the negative impact of algorithmic misconduct on the

241. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 519.
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market rather than the provable scienter of the programmer, which
would increase the deterrent effect of the legal framework.
To balance the potential chilling effect of the proposed harmbased approach that eschews scienter as a basis of liability, this Article
proposes that if the algorithm’s conduct is proven to be harmful to the
market, this creates a rebuttable presumption of liability. Specifically,
to the extent the trading algorithm impairs market efficiency or
undermines investor protection, there should be a presumption of
liability for manipulation. Once regulators or private plaintiffs are able
to demonstrate that the algorithm’s conduct harmed the market, as
discussed below, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide evidence
rebutting her presumed liability. The presumption of liability may be
rebutted with a showing, for example, that the algorithm has worked
appropriately in the past and has not been improperly adjusted or that
the factors that caused the algorithm to distort the markets were
unforeseeable to the programmer.
Importantly, the burden shift in this instance is key to
increasing deterrence for two reasons. First, it eliminates the need for
regulators to provide notoriously difficult evidence of manipulative
intent and, instead, allows them to rely on proof of market harm.
Second, the rebuttable presumption places the burden on programmers
to justify the conduct of their algorithms. In sum, by alleviating the
evidentiary burden on regulators to prove scienter, which is notoriously
difficult to prove, the harm-based approach places the burden on the
defendants to demonstrate why they should not be held accountable for
the actions of their algorithms. This makes it less likely that would-be
manipulators can evade punishment by hiding behind their algorithms’
complexity. Rather, programmers would be required to demonstrate
that the algorithm’s misconduct was the product of negligence or
unforeseeable circumstances.
Although proving that transactions harmed the market may be
difficult, it would be easier to establish than the programmer’s
manipulative intent. Harm can be proven using objective, market-based
evidence, historical data, and deep econometric analysis, among other
factors.242 It is susceptible to proof beyond factors and information
outside the defendant’s control. Intent, on the other hand, is subjective
and rarely is there direct evidence of a defendant’s intent to
manipulate.243 In the absence of such direct proof, plaintiffs and

242. See id. at 521–23 (discussing methods for determining artificial pricing).
243. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 23, at 519 (“[T]he difficulty of reading people’s minds and
thus the need to infer manipulative intent from actions are explicitly recognized as a problem in
the area.”).
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regulators must rely on circumstantial evidence, inferring
manipulative intent from factors such as volume, size, and timing of
transactions. Many of these factors, however, are open to multiple
interpretations, particularly when ex post justification is needed.244
Focusing on the harm that arises from algorithmic trading to determine
liability for manipulation, therefore, provides more certain punishment
for misconduct, enhancing the deterrent effect of the legal framework.
2. Adopt a Recklessness Standard
An alternative to the elimination of scienter from the liability
framework is to reduce the standard when applied to algorithm-related
misconduct. Recall, price manipulation, open-market manipulation,
and spoofing all require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant
intentionally manipulated the market; the fraud-based standard is met
with a showing of recklessness.245
Instead of these varying, hard to prove bases of liability, the
recklessness standard ought to be the highest scienter standard
applicable to algorithm-related manipulation, regardless of the form of
manipulation alleged. While not an easy standard, recklessness is a
better fit for liability in algorithmic markets. Recall, under the
recklessness standard, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant’s conduct was so far outside the scope of ordinary care that it
is difficult to believe that the defendant did not know that what she was
doing was wrong.246 Key to liability under the recklessness standard is
the standard of ordinary care, which many courts apply objectively.247

244. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 515–16 (“Yet, given the permissibility of traders’ actions in cases
of open-market manipulation, these factors are all subject to interpretation.”).
245. See supra Section II.A (discussing the various scienter standards under the existing antimanipulation regime).
246. See note 104 and accompanying text.
247. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977):
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as . . . highly unreasonable [conduct], involving not
merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it.
(quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)); see
also McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 788 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendant’s conduct
was such an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care that it posed a danger to
buyers and sellers); SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002) (defining recklessness as a highly
unreasonable omission); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“[R]ecklessness only satisfies scienter under § 10(b) to the extent that it reflects some degree of
intentional or conscious misconduct . . . recklessness in the § 10(b) context is, in the words of the
Supreme Court, a form of intentional conduct.”).
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With a recklessness standard, holding programmers liable for
the misbehavior of their algorithms would turn less on whether the
programmer intended the algorithm’s actions and more on whether the
programmer’s conduct in designing, building, and testing the algorithm
comported with objective standards of ordinary care. For example,
private plaintiffs and regulators could hold the programmers of preset
algorithms liable for manipulation by showing that the programmer
failed to comply with industry norms or regulatory standards in
creating and implementing the algorithm.
AI algorithms that learn to engage in manipulation or rational
distortion, however, may be more difficult for the recklessness standard
to address. On the one hand, if the AI algorithm evolves to manipulate
the markets, the programmer’s liability for the algorithm’s independent
misconduct may rest on whether she followed industry norms and
standards in designing the algorithm. Even with AI algorithms,
programmers should build in guardrails and other mechanisms to
prevent the algorithm from engaging in independent misconduct. If she
failed to do so, then she ought to be liable for the algorithm’s
unanticipated actions. On the other hand, if the algorithm’s learning is
the result of negligence, the recklessness standard would not be
sufficient to hold the programmer liable. This would be a shortcoming
of the recklessness standard, but some may view it as a necessary
limitation if one believes that liability for manipulation ought to be
based on deliberate misconduct, even if an algorithm is involved.
Nonetheless, reducing the scienter standard to recklessness for
all manipulation enforcement actions involving an algorithm would
ease the burden of proof applicable to regulators, making it more likely
that they can hold programmers accountable for their conduct. The
recklessness standard is also more applicable to the realities of
algorithm-dominated markets. A potential wrongdoer may be able to
plausibly deny intentionality with her algorithm’s manipulative
behavior; but, based on objective market and industry standards, it may
be more difficult to credibly deny that her algorithm was designed
within the standards of ordinary care. Essential to the efficacy of
recklessness as a more applicable standard is the objectivity of the
standard itself, which removes the subjective intent of the programmer
from the equation. An objective standard, such as recklessness, enables
regulators to more easily bring enforcement actions based on factors
less susceptible to subjectivity, such as intent. Thus, lowering the
standard to recklessness increases deterrence by enhancing the
likelihood of punishment for manipulation.
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3. Meaningful, Harmonized Regulatory Oversight
A final proposal to improve deterrence of the anti-manipulation
framework is to bolster and harmonize regulatory oversight of
algorithmic trading in the securities and commodities markets.
Increasing the resources and expertise of both agencies would,
undoubtedly, emphasize certainty of punishment against algorithmrelated manipulation. But more can and ought to be done to enhance
the enforcement capabilities of the primary financial market
regulators. As discussed above, the SEC and the CFTC have vastly
divergent oversight of algorithmic trading in their respective
jurisdictions, which undermines deterrence because detection is
decreased and punishment is inconsistent across markets.248
Meaningful, harmonized regulatory oversight of the financial markets
as a whole, therefore, would undoubtedly increase the credibility of the
regime’s deterrence.
Most obviously, the CFTC needs to adopt, at a minimum, a
registration framework similar to that of the SEC for programmers and
traders that utilize algorithms in their trading.249 Imposing affirmative
obligations on programmers to implement practices that reduce the
likelihood of harm arising from their algorithms would improve the
CFTC’s mostly nonexistent oversight of algorithmic trading. Further,
the CFTC should also require programmers to pass qualifying exams
required of humans who trade in the commodities and derivatives
markets. At minimum, these requirements will bring the CFTC’s
oversight of algorithmic trading in line with the SEC’s and also provide
the agency with greater oversight of the market’s technological
infrastructure. On the one hand, given the CFTC’s failure to pass Reg
AT, the agency may be reluctant to adopt such a framework. But, on
the other hand, the rising importance of algorithmic trading in the
commodities markets may push the CFTC to adopt these regulations to
safeguard the markets’ integrity and stability.
In addition to making the Commissions’ supervision of
algorithmic trading more harmonized, the Commissions should bolster
their oversight and regulation of the market to improve their capacity
to detect algorithm-related manipulation and hold wrongdoers
accountable. In this regard, this Article has two potential suggestions.
First, the Commissions should require attestations from
algorithm designers and users that the algorithm is not designed to

248. See discussion supra Sections III.C, III.D.
249. See Foley et al., supra note 195 (providing an overview of FINRA rules requiring
registration of persons who oversee algorithmic securities trading).
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violate applicable laws and regulations. Such attestations would be
comparable to the requirements that a company’s Chief Executive
Officer and Chief Financial Officer attest that the company’s annual
and quarterly reports are accurate and complete.250 In so certifying,
these officers assert that, based on their knowledge, the reports are not
misleading, fairly represent the financial condition of the company, and
that they have personally reviewed the reports. 251 Importantly, false
attestations violate Rule 10b-5 (among other provisions) and can
provide the basis for establishing intentionality or recklessness to hold
the officers liable.252
This Article proposes a similar attestation requirement in which
programmers and users of algorithms attest that, based on their
knowledge and review of the algorithm, it complies with securities and
commodities laws, especially (for the purposes of this Article) the antimanipulation regime. The attestation requirement would provide
regulators with an initial basis to allege violation of anti-manipulation
laws if a defendant’s attestations later prove to be false. Indeed, the
attestations could be used to prove the defendant’s knowing violation of
the laws, since she would be required to assert that she reviewed the
code and it complied with laws.
Relatedly, these attestations could serve as a basis for vicarious
liability. If an accused certifies that she is responsible for an algorithm’s
design and operation, then she ought to likewise be liable for the
algorithm’s misconduct. The attestations here legally bind the
programmer to the algorithm in such a manner that she can be held
accountable for its actions, even without proof of manipulative intent.
By imposing this prerequisite to deploy algorithms in the market, the
legal regime would ease enforcement actions by providing regulators
with a mechanism to assign liability without the burden of scienter.
Notably, these attestations could render programmers liable for
an algorithm’s unforeseen misconduct that manipulates the market.
Such extensive liability could have a chilling effect on the development
of trading algorithms. But it could also make the deterrence regime
more effective by forcing programmers to internalize the potential risk
of harm their algorithms pose. Although holding programmers liable for
250. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7241) (requiring an issuer’s principal executive and financial officers
each to certify the financial and other information contained in the issuer’s quarterly and
annual reports).
251. Id.; see also Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67
Fed. Reg. 57,276 (Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270, 274)
(establishing rules as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
252. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2020) (making it unlawful “[t]o make any untrue statement of a
material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”).
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the conduct of their AI may be seen as reasonable by some, others may
view this as a bridge too far. Should lawmakers decide to adopt a harmbased approach to algorithmic manipulation, then these attestations
would provide a basis for liability even for independent algorithmic
misconduct. But if a recklessness approach is adopted instead,
regulators could decide to exclude such unforeseen misconduct from the
scope of the attestations, if the misconduct is the result of negligence.
In the end, the scope of liability that may arise from these attestations
will depend on the extent to which regulators and lawmakers seek to
emphasize the certainty of punishment for algorithmic manipulation,
including independent algorithmic misconduct.
Second, the Commissions ought to consider how and to what
extent they want to incentivize explainable AI in the markets. Despite
the shortcomings of explainable AI, it holds great promise for reducing
the opacity of black box AI algorithms. Working alongside academics
and industry participants, the Commissions ought to contemplate how
explainable AI can be used to both help provide ex post justifications for
harmful market conduct and aid in identifying manipulative behavior
in the market. The promise of algorithms and similar technological
advances is not only for traders hoping to be more profitable. There is
great potential for regulators to utilize algorithms to help identify
market misconduct faster and more effectively than before.253
Here, the CFTC’s actions are promising. In 2017, the agency
launched LabCFTC to promote its efforts to engage with financial
technology innovators and facilitate its understanding of new
technologies in the market.254 A primary goal of the office is to identify
interactions between the regulatory framework that could be improved
in order to promote “responsible innovation.”255 Thus, the CFTC is
proactively engaging with new technologies to enhance its own
understanding and to accomplish its regulatory goals more effectively
and efficiently. This type of dual engagement with new technologies is
necessary for regulators to develop more robust understanding and
oversight of new technologies, such as algorithmic trading and AI
algorithms with machine learning techniques.
Undeniably, there are other ways in which the Commissions can
improve their regulation of algorithms in the markets. These
preliminary proposals, however, serve as a positive first step towards
253. See Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech, and the
Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 374–75 (2017) (arguing
that regulation technology could make market supervision more effective).
254. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, LABCFTC OVERVIEW, https://www.cftc.gov/
LabCFTC/Overview/index.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9LYT-56JA].
255. Id.
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expanding oversight of algorithmic trading in such a way to credibly
deter algorithm-related manipulation and meaningfully reduce the
systemic risks that accompany it.
CONCLUSION
Preset and AI algorithmic trading programs will continue to play
a major role in the financial markets for the foreseeable future.
Therefore, it is increasingly necessary to consider the law’s
effectiveness in punishing manipulative conduct effectuated with these
evolving technologies. Applying the anti-manipulation framework to
algorithmic trading reveals a serious gap that undermines one of the
framework’s fundamental purposes: deterring market manipulation.
This Article demonstrates the pervasive shortcomings of the
manipulation framework in deterring algorithmic manipulation by
explaining how the scienter requirement decreases the likelihood of
punishment. The law’s focus on scienter limits its applicability to
algorithmic manipulation both because algorithms cannot form
intent and because the difficulty in proving the intent of the
programmer renders any enforcement for market manipulation
uncertain and ineffective.
Importantly, the law’s failure to deter algorithmic manipulation
undermines market stability, exposing the market to a significant
source of systemic risk. To address the mismatch between the realities
of algorithmic trading and the requirements of the anti-manipulation
regime, this Article highlights the benefits to be gained from embracing
explainable and transparent algorithms but cautions against this being
the only solution in achieving a credible deterrent framework. As such,
this Article also suggests ways to modernize the anti-manipulation
framework as applied to algorithmic trading and improve regulatory
oversight of the market. Together, these suggestions would emphasize
certainty of punishment and increase the likelihood of programmers
being held accountable for the harm resulting from their algorithmic
trading programs. By emphasizing certainty, this Article presents
options to achieve credible deterrence of algorithmic manipulation,
thereby allowing the law to remain effective in the face of
technological evolution and, importantly, to promote market efficiency
and investor protection.

